Frederick J Hanna & Assoc Capital One Bank and Frederick J. Hanna and Associates in Atlanta Georgia are the worst offenders. Marietta, Georgia

They inflate to amounts owed and use Robo Signed Affidavits to support their cases in the hopes the Judges that are handling the cases will give them Summary Judgments against the defendant. Unfortunately they have learned that the Judges do just that especially when the defendant is a Pro Se (without attorney) There is a case now before the Appeals Court in Atlanta dealing directly with this issue. Case number  A12A1626. This problem was taken up with the US Assistant Attorney in Macon and the FBI office in Columbus, Georgia. The FBI agents could not get comfortable with taking this as a cse even though Capital One and Hanna have thousands of these cases and are stealing millions from the alleged card holder.

If its a Company Credit Card consider this:623 S.E.2d 208
GROTH et al. v. ACE CASH EXPRESS, INC.
No. A05A1496.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
November 14, 2005.
Paul L. Groth, pro se.
Christopher C. Welton, pro se.
Kilpatrick Stockton, Stephen E. Atlanta, for appellee.
RUFFIN, Chief Judge.

Paul Groth and Christopher Welton appeal the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Ace Cash Express, Inc. ("Ace") on Ace's claim that they were personally liable to Ace as guarantors of the debts of Empire Financial, LLP ("Empire"). Groth and Welton argue that the trial court instead should have granted their motion for summary judgment because the guaranty Ace seeks to enforce does not satisfy the Statute of Frauds. We agree and reverse. Summary judgment is proper where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.1 We review de novo a trial court's decision on summary judgment.

On appeal, Groth and Welton argue that the Empire assignment cannot bind them as a personal guaranty because it does not satisfy the Statute of Frauds, which requires that a promise to pay the debt of another be in writing and signed by the party making the guaranty.4 Groth and Welton contend that the guaranty language in the Empire assignment cannot bind them as a personal guaranty because they signed the contract on behalf of Empire, not in their individual capacities.

It is undisputed that the Empire assignment is a contract among Southern, Empire, and Ace, and that Groth and Welton signed it on behalf of Empire as its partners.5 This case is, therefore, distinguishable from those in which the parties dispute whether a guaranty was signed in a person's individual or corporate capacity,6 or those where a single contract was signed twice, once in an individual and once in a corporate capacity.7 The relevant question here is whether Groth's and Welton's signatures on behalf of Empire could also bind them individually to the purported personal guaranty referenced in the Empire assignment.

The trial court relied on Gigandet v. Lighting Galleries8 in finding that Groth's and Welton's signatures bound them personally as well as binding the company. In Gigandet, the president of a corporation signed an account agreement in his capacity as president. The agreement specifically stated that "`[i]f the . . . account debtor is a corporation, the undersigned agree to personally guarantee . . . payment of any charges.'"9 The Gigandet court found that, in light of the specific contractual provision subjecting the corporate officer to personal liability, his single signature bound both the officer individually and the corporation.10

Initially, we note that Gigandet is physical precedent only and thus not binding.11 Moreover, a single signature generally denotes that the person is signing in either an individual or representative capacity, but not both.12 And, unlike in Gigandet, the assignment contract in this case does not unequivocally state that Groth and Welton are guaranteeing Empire's debt.13 Under these circumstances, we cannot find that Groth's and Welton's signatures on behalf of Empire also served to bind them individually.14 Accordingly, the alleged personal guaranty was not signed by the parties making it, as required by the Statute of Frauds.15 It follows that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Ace and in denying Groth and Welton's motion for summary judgment.

Judgment reversed. JOHNSON, P.J., and BARNES, J., concur.The Court of Appeals Ruling in this case is more than sufficient to justify the Court granting Defendants Motion for a Dismissal