Marc Lazo Marc wants to look good by making others look bad Irvine California

 Dear Pest Control, We need your contact info. Marc Lazo was not the brother of the person who owned the property and was in fact defrauding escrow and others about ownership. He is now currently a defendant in a lawsuit relating to this. Can you contact the Law Offices of Joe Ferruci? Your assistance would be very valuable.

After further research, I can understand why this attorney is threatening me. Pasted below is a recent action is brought against him for disciplinary action by the State Bar of California on 4 counts of misconduct involving a single client matter. Maybe he really needs the money he's trying to get out of my company by threatening us.

It is a long read, in PDF format it is 21 pages on letter size paper.

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FILED JUNE 20, 2013
STATE BAR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
HEARING DEPARTMENT – LOS ANGELES
In the Matter of
MARC Y. LAZO,
Member No. 215998,
A Member of the State Bar.
)
)
Case No.:
12-O-13956-DFM
DECISION
INTRODUCTION
Respondent Marc Y. Lazo (Respondent) is charged here with four counts of misconduct involving a single client matter. The counts include allegations that Respondent willfully violated (1) Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (d) 1 (seeking to mislead a judge); (2) section 6103 (failure to obey court order) [two counts]; and (3) section 6068, subdivision (b) (failure to maintain respect to the court). The State Bar had the burden of proving the above charges by clear and convincing evidence. The court finds culpability and recommends discipline as set forth below.
1 Unless otherwise noted, all future references to section(s) will be to the Business and Professions Code.
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PERTINENT PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Notice of Disciplinary Charges (NDC) was filed in this matter by the State Bar of California on December 11, 2012. On January 8, 2013, Respondent filed his response to the NDC.
An initial status conference was held in the matter on January 28, 2013. At that time, the case was given a trial date of April 16, 2013, with a two-day trial estimate. By agreement of the parties, trial was commenced early, on April 10, 2013; continued on April 17; and, due to the unavailability of a designated defense witness, completed on April 26, 2013. The State Bar was represented at trial by Senior Trial Counsel Kimberly G. Anderson. Respondent was represented at trial by Theodore A. Cohen.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The following findings of fact are based on Respondent‟s response to the NDC, the stipulation of undisputed facts previously filed by the parties, and the documentary and testimonial evidence admitted at trial.
Jurisdiction
Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in California on December 3, 2001, and has been a member of the State Bar at all relevant times.
Case No. 12-O-13956
Beginning in or about July 2011, Respondent appeared as counsel on behalf of his client, defendant Nahed Anwar Girgis (Girgis) in the case entitled Ayers v. Girgis, Orange County Superior Court (the Girgis action). The lawsuit was an action by an attorney (Ayers) against his former client (Girgis) to collect legal fees. After Respondent became Girgis‟ attorney in the matter, he filed a cross-complaint for legal malpractice against Ayers on behalf of Girgis.
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On November 13, 2011, Respondent‟s father passed away. Funeral services were held for the father in Orange County in December 2011.
Thereafter, on December 22, 2011, the court held a Case Management Conference (CMC) in the Girgis action. The court scheduled the case to begin trial on April 2, 2012, for an estimated 5-6 day trial. Respondent was present at the CMC; made no objection to the April 2, 2012 trial date; and had actual notice of the court‟s order setting the trial for April 2, 2012.
On January 18, 2012, with knowledge of the April 2, 2012 trial date, Respondent purchased refundable plane tickets for himself and his mother for a four-week trip to Europe and the Middle East, commencing on March 30, 2012 (three days before the Girgis trial was scheduled to commence). The itinerary for the trip included departing from Los Angeles on March 30, 2012; arriving in Paris and departing to Rome on March 31, 2012; staying in Italy until April 7, 2012; traveling from Rome to Paris and Paris to Beirut on April 7, 2012; staying in Lebanon until April 25, 2012; traveling from Beirut to Paris on April 25, 2012; staying in France until April 28, 2012; and then returning from Paris to Los Angeles on April 28, 2012. As part of this trip, Respondent and his mother would attend a ceremony to honor the dead, held each year shortly after Easter Sunday at the family‟s historic hometown in Lebanon. In 2012, the ceremony was scheduled to take place on April 15.
On February 18, 2012, Respondent‟s uncle in Italy died.2 Because the uncle was relatively young, his unexpected death was initially viewed as suspicious by some members of
2 When a State Bar investigator sent an investigation letter to Respondent regarding this matter, she asked Respondent to identify the name, relationship, and date of death of the family member who had passed away. In response, Respondent identified both his father and his uncle. In stating the date of death of the uncle, however, Respondent twice represented to the State Bar, under penalty of perjury, that the uncle had died on March 18, 2012. (Exh. 27, p. 2.)
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the family. However, as testified to by Respondent‟s brother, it was determined within a week of the uncle‟s death that the death had been from natural causes.
On or about February 27, 2012, Respondent asked Ayers to agree to continue the trial. In conjunction with that request, he emailed a copy of his travel itinerary to Ayers. The itinerary included the information that the trip had been purchased on January 19, 2012. Ayers refused to agree to the continuance.
On March 19, 2012, Respondent filed a document entitled “Notice of Non-Availability” with the Orange County Superior Court in the Girgis matter, implying that no action could be taken in the matter from March 30, 2012, through April 28, 2012. On March 21, 2012, the court issued an order striking the notice, based on Carl v. Superior Court (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 73 [such notices are not proper documents under the California Rules of Court]. In its order, the court stated, “In the instant action trial of this matter has been long set for April 2, 2012. No continuance of that date may be obtained by the filing of a notice of non-availability.”
On March 21, 2012, the same day as the above order and only 12 days before the Girgis trial was scheduled to begin, Respondent filed an ex parte application to continue the April 2, 2012 trial date. The ex parte application stated, “Recently a close family member of trial counsel, Marc Lazo, passed away. Arrangements were thereafter made to join other family members out of the country during the month of April, 2012.” (Exh. 8, p. 3; underlining added.) At another point in the application, it was stated that Respondent “will be out of the country from March 30, 2012, through and including, April 28, 2012, due to the recent passing of a family member.” Respondent‟s declaration in support of the March 21, 2012 ex parte application stated, “A very close family member recently passed away. Arrangements have been made for my family to travel to Lebanon on March 30, 2012. I plan on returning on April 28, 2012. A
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copy of my itinerary is attached hereto as Exhibit „B‟.” Unlike the copy of the itinerary previously provided to Ayers, the copy of Respondent‟s itinerary attached to the Respondent‟s declaration as Exhibit “B” did not contain the January 19, 2012 purchase date of the plane tickets.
Ayers, having only been given notice of this intended motion by email sent by Respondent‟s office at 7:47 p.m. on the evening of March 20, nonetheless filed an opposition to the continuance request, attaching a copy of the itinerary showing the January 2012 purchase date. This purchase date was before the date of the uncle‟s “recent” death in February, after the case had been set for trial in December 2011, and more than two months before Respondent sought “emergency” ex parte relief. In addition, Ayers complained that Respondent had failed to provide him with a copy of the ex parte application May 21, even after it had been filed, despite several requests from Ayers for a copy of the application. (Exh. 10, p. 2.) Ayers contended that, “The defense attorney‟s [Respondent‟s] undisclosed acts and his misrepresentations have been blatantly dishonest, and his conduct has been in total disregard of any professional ethics, courtesy or consideration. He has demonstrated a remarkable disdain not only for opposing counsel, but for the court‟s own calendar and limited resources.” (Exh. 10, p. 7.) Finally, Ayers contended that prejudice would result to him if the trial were continued.
On March 22, 2012, the court issued an order denying Respondent‟s ex parte application. In denying the requested relief, the court initially noted that Respondent‟s “undated” itinerary revealed a one-week layover in Rome prior to traveling to Beirut. The court then went on to state:
Initially the Court‟s concern with the foregoing was heightened by the one week “layover” in Rome prior to Mr. Lazo‟s attending to the unexplained event in Beirut. Adding to this concern is Mr. Lazo‟s failure to identify his relationship with the unnamed decedent; both suggesting this trip to be more in the nature of a
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planned vacation. However, the Court‟s concerns take on greater urgency in light of a review of Exhibit I to the Opposition filed by Plaintiff. Exhibit I is a copy of an email from Mr. Lazo to Mr. Ayers dated February 27, 2012, i.e., almost one month ago. The content of this email contains the “I Travel” itinerary attached to the instant ex parte application as Exhibit B. However, unlike Exhibit B, Exhibit I contains the date upon which I Travel confirmed Mr. Lazo‟s reservations and itinerary as 19 January, 2012, i.e., two months ago.
The history of this lawsuit is long and checkered. The trial date for this action was established at a case management conference held December 22, 2011; a conference at which both Mr. Ayers and Mr. Lazo participated. Clearly, Mr. Lazo has known of the trial date since the December trial setting. Under the circumstances the parties deserve to have this action resolved on the long established trial date, April 2, 2012. The application for trial continuance is denied.
In addition to denying the requested continuance, the court‟s March 22, 2012 order then went on to order Respondent to appear at the scheduled trial:
Mr. Lazo is ordered to appear in department C-20 of the Superior Court of California in and for the County of Orange at 9:00 a.m. on April 2, 2012, ready and prepared to represent the defendant in the trial of this action.
(Exh. 11, p. 2.)
After receiving the above order, on March 27, 2012, Respondent filed a “Renewed” ex parte application for an order continuing the trial date. In it, he stated, in pertinent part:
I am physically unable to appear for trial of this matter due to my need to travel outside the country on March 30, 2012. I will be traveling with my mother on this trip in order to attend to necessary family business in Italy and Lebanon for a period of one month.
I have never had such pressing issues that have required that I leave the country, and have never asked for a trial continuance in my career. I simply cannot be in this country during the month of April for reasons I cannot make public.
I had a death in my immediate family late last year, and will not publicize anything further to this Court or anyone else.
(Exh. 12, p. 7.)
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In this renewed ex parte application, Respondent still did not identify the immediate family member who had passed away.
Ayers again objected to the requested continuance. On March 28, 2012, the court issued an order, again denying Respondent‟s requested continuance:
Having grossly misrepresented the facts surrounding the basis and circumstances reported in an earlier ex parte application to continue next week‟s trial of the above entitled action, Attorney Lazo once again repeats his application to continue trial. The latest iteration provides no explanation, or even apology for the misrepresentations and omissions of the previous application. Instead, Mr. Lazo simply demands to be accommodated.
(Exh. 15.)
The Respondent received notice of the court‟s March 28, 2012 order, and he had actual notice that the case remained scheduled to begin trial on April 2, 2012. Nonetheless, despite the court‟s order of March 22, 2012, Respondent failed to appear for trial on April 2, 2012. Instead, he had boarded a plane with his mother on March 30, 2012, and he had flown to Europe.
When Respondent failed to appear when the Girgis action was called for trial, the court continued the trial until April 30, 2012, and issued (1) an order to show cause (OSC) re sanctions against Respondent for his failure to comply with the order to appear for the trial; and (2) an OSC re contempt against Respondent. The hearing of the OSC re sanctions was set for April 30, 2012; the hearing of the contempt OSC was set for May 29, 2012. On April 19, 2012, Girgis, who had gone to the court on April 2, 2012, replaced Respondent as her counsel in the Girgis action.
On April 30, 2012, after Respondent had returned from his trip, the hearing was held on the OSC re sanctions. During the hearing, Respondent again refused to provide the court with any details regarding his reasons for being out of the country for a month, other than to say that it was “family business:”
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My family situation is not something I can publicize. I can tell you this was not a family vacation. I can explain the difference between the two itineraries. What I would like to do is submit something under seal that the court can review. I cannot publicize this for family reasons. . . .
Your, honor, please, my family, the sacredy [sic] of my family‟s trust is at stake here and I cannot violate that. . . . I tell you I traveled with my mother. It was not a family vacation. We had family business to take care of due to my deceased father‟s situation that occurred in November, on November 13th. [¶] That‟s – I don‟t even want to say that. That‟s what happened.
(Exh. 24, p. 8.)
With regard to the difference between the dated itinerary that had been provided by Respondent to Ayers and the undated itinerary provided by Respondent to the court with his first ex parte application, Respondent stated to the court that they were different documents, received by him at different times from the travel agency:
The first itinerary was just an estimate of when I was going to be gone. The second itinerary was confirmation. I can get a declaration from the travel agent to basically confirm that the original itinerary, which I basically had the travel agent plan, I did not confirm until immediately before I submitted it to the court.3
(Exh. 24, p. 8.)
The court ordered Respondent to pay $3,654.20 in monetary sanctions to Ayers and also required him to report the ordered sanctions to the State Bar. At the same time, the court vacated the OSC re contempt. The April 30, 2012 order did not state a specific due date for the payment of the sanctions.
On May 7, 2012, Respondent reported the sanctions to the State Bar. In his report, he stated, “The Court found that I misrepresented the nature of my one month travel out of the country due to a family emergency stemming from a death in my immediate family last
3 During the trial of this matter, Respondent presented an expert witness to rebut any inference that Respondent had deliberately deleted the date from the exhibit provided to the court. This expert‟s testimony made clear that there were not two different itineraries sent by the travel agency, but only one.
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November. I refuse to make personal family circumstances public record and asked the judge for an in-chambers hearing to explain what happened at the OSC hearing, which the judge refused. … I have done nothing wrong and have never been sanctioned or disciplined.” (Exh. 22; emphasis in original.)
On November 30, 2012, Respondent paid Ayers $3,654.20. At trial, Respondent testified that he paid the sanctions after meeting with Judge Platel of this court, presumably at the ENE prior to formal charges being filed.
Count 1 – Section 6068, subd. (d) [Seeking to Mislead a Judge]
Section 6068, subdivision (d), makes it a duty of an attorney never to seek to mislead a judge by an artifice or false statement of fact or law. The State Bar alleges that Respondent‟s conduct in filing his two ex parte motions to continue the scheduled trial violated the proscription of this statute.
This court agrees that Respondent‟s conduct, as described above, constituted a willful violation by him of his obligation not to mislead a judge by an artifice or false statement of fact. In Respondent‟s first application, he failed to disclose that his trip to Italy, France and Lebanon had been planned months before in January 2012. Moreover, the copy of the itinerary, provided by Respondent to the court with his application, did not include the purchase date. Instead, he represented, by both his words and his conduct, that his need to travel to Europe had just resulted from an unanticipated “emergency” arising from the “recent” death of a family member. “Arrangements were thereafter made to join other family members out of the country during the month of April, 2012.” (Exh. 8, p. 3; emphasis added.)
At the time that the travel arrangements were made in January, Respondent‟s uncle had not yet died. As a result, the amount of time that was booked in January for Respondent and his
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mother to spend in Italy was not predicated on any need for Respondent to deal with the circumstances of the uncle‟s death. Nor can it be said that the father‟s death was a “recent” one at the time of the March 21, 2012 ex parte application. The father died in November of the preceding year – and before the Girgis matter was set for trial.
In a sworn statement to the State Bar, Respondent stated, “The first March 22, 2012 Application indicates that I was seeking a continuance due to “a close family member” of mine having recently passed away. This is my uncle Michael, whom I have known since I was a child.” (Exh. 27, p. 4.) Respondent reiterated this fact during his trial testimony in this matter. Given that the uncle died in February 2012, Respondent‟s attendant statement, quoted above, that “arrangements were thereafter made,” was inaccurate and misleading, since those arrangements had been made in January 2012, before the uncle died.
Later, at the hearing of the OSC re sanctions, Respondent acknowledged, as previously noted above, that his need to travel to Europe did not result from the recent death of his uncle, but rather from the death of his father the prior year:
We had family business to take care of due to my deceased father‟s situation that occurred in November, on November 13th. [¶] That‟s – I don‟t even want to say that. That‟s what happened.”
Count 2 –Section 6103 [Failure to Obey Court Order]
Section 6103 provides, in pertinent part: “A willful disobedience or violation of an order of the court requiring him to do or forbear an act connected with or in the course of his profession, which he ought in good faith to do or forbear, … constitute causes for disbarment or suspension.”
Respondent was ordered by the court in Girgis to appear for the scheduled trial on April 2, 2012, prepared to begin trial. When Respondent failed to attend the trial, he disobeyed that
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court order. Such disobedience violated section 6103. (In the Matter of Hunter (Review Dept. 1994) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 63, 72-73 [failure to attend court-ordered hearings is violation of section 6103].) The fact that Respondent was under pressure from his family to accompany his mother on her trip to Lebanon, at the same time that he was ordered to begin trial on behalf of his client, does not excuse his decision to disobey the court‟s order and his professional obligations.
Count 3 –Section 6103 [Failure to Obey Court Order]
In the court‟s sanction order of April 30, 2012, the court ordered Respondent to pay $3,654.20 to Ayers as sanctions. Respondent did not pay those sanctions until November 30, 2012, after he was aware that disciplinary actions were being pursued by the State Bar.
Where an order of sanctions does not include a specific deadline for the payment to be effected, the sanctioned attorney is obligated to comply with the order within a reasonable period of time. In the Matter of Respondent Y (Review Dept. 1998) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 862, 867-868.) Here, Respondent had notice of the sanction order on April 30, 2012. He did not comply with it for seven months, and then did so only after he became aware that the State Bar was about to file disciplinary charges against him. Until that time he had taken no steps, either at the trial or appellate court levels, to seek any relief from his obligation to comply with the order.
At trial, Respondent sought to justify his failure to pay the sanctions earlier by stating that he had intended to appeal the sanction order but the time to do so had not yet started. Given that Respondent had been removed as the attorney of record in the action and the order required him to pay money, this contention fails to justify his conduct in merely ignoring the order. (See Barton v. Ahmanson Developments, Inc. (1993) 17 Cal. App. 4th 1358, 1361 [removed attorney may immediately appeal order of sanctions]; Code of Civ. Proc., § 680.230 [“Judgment" means “a judgment, order, or decree entered in a court of this state.”]
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Respondent‟s failure to comply for seven months with the order that he pay sanctions to Ayers constituted a failure by him to comply with a court order and a willful violation of section 6103.
Count 4 – Section 6068, subd. (b) [Failure to Maintain Respect to the Court]
Section 6068, subdivision (b) requires an attorney to maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and to judicial officers. In this count, the State Bar asserts that the very same conduct that gives rise to this court‟s findings of culpability above, also constituted a violation of Respondent‟s obligations under section 6068, subdivision (d).
It is well-settled that a violation of a court order is better addressed under section 6103 than under section 6068(b). (See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1056, 1060; In the Matter of Klein (Review Dept. 1994) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 1, 9; and In the Matter of Kaplan (Review Dept. 1993) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 509, 522.) Nor is there any purpose to be served by making duplicative findings of culpability based on the same conduct. (See In the Matter of Torres (Review Dept. 2000) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 138, 148-149.) Accordingly, this count is dismissed with prejudice. (In the Matter of Field (Review Dept. 2010) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 171, 176, fn. 4.)
Aggravating Circumstances
The State Bar bears the burden of proving aggravating circumstances by clear and convincing evidence. (Rules Proc. of State Bar, tit. IV, Stds. for Atty. Sanctions for Prof. Misconduct, std. 1.2(b).) 4 The court finds the following with regard to aggravating factors.
4 All further references to standard(s) or std. are to this source.
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Multiple Acts of Misconduct
Respondent has been found culpable of three counts of misconduct in the present proceeding. The existence of such multiple acts of misconduct is an aggravating circumstance. (Std. 1.2(b)(ii).)
Significant Harm
Standard 1.2(b)(iv) provides as an aggravating circumstance that the member‟s misconduct harmed significantly a client, the public or the administration of justice. Respondent‟s failure to appear for the trial on April 2, 2012, resulted in the trial having to be continued, to the detriment of both the court and the parties. This is an aggravating factor.
Bad Faith/Concealment/Dishonesty/Overreaching
Standard 1.2(b)(iii) provides as an aggravating circumstance that the member‟s misconduct was surrounded by or followed by bad faith, dishonesty, concealment, overreaching or other violations of the State Bar Act or Rules of Professional Conduct.
Respondent‟s efforts to justify his decision to go to Europe, rather than appear for trial, have been surrounded by bad faith, concealment and dishonesty in addition to the acts underlying the findings of culpability above.
Perhaps the most egregious of these acts is embodied in Respondent‟s Exhibit T, a letter sent by Respondent on the eve of trial to Judge Chaffee, the judge in the Girgis matter and the complaining party in this proceeding. During the trial of this disciplinary matter, Respondent‟s brother was called by Respondent as a witness in the case. During his testimony, he recounted that the uncle‟s unexpected death at a young age had initially raised concerns of foul play, but that it was determined within a week that the uncle had died of natural causes. There was no contrary testimony or evidence offered by Respondent on that issue. In contrast, in Respondent‟s
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letter to Judge Chaffey, dated March 8, 2013, Respondent sought to justify his decision to violate the judge‟s March 22, 2012 order by claiming that his uncle had been murdered and Respondent needed to fly to Italy to deal with the issue:
There is an annual cultural ceremony called “Thursday of the Dead” that is held in my mother‟s village in Lebanon. It honors the deceased who have passed during the year prior and is a communal prayer for the salvation of the souls. In the tradition of my mother‟s village, the Thursday of the Dead ceremony has to take place on the first Sunday following Easter Day. The tickets for my travel during April 2012 were purchased on January 18, 2011 to attend this ceremony. After my uncle passed a month later, because of the circumstances surrounding his death, which involved murder for the inheritance of land, there was no way to get out of the trip. (Exh. T, p. 2.)
…
Your Honor, I would like you to please know that I never misled or misinformed the Court in any way. The Bar, and you, I believe, feel that the trip was a vacation rather than an emergency that I had to take. When I say it was an “emergency,” I mean that when we learned of my uncle‟s death on February 25, and that a family member of my mother‟s had been accused of murdering him, we were required to attend to family business out of the country. It was me supporting my mother and aunt while trying to maintain my own sanity. (Exh. T, p. 3.)
Your Honor, my culture is not one that publicizes tragedies, particularly those surrounded by scandal as was the case with my uncle‟s passing. I just could not put anything in a publicly filed document, which is why I had requested oral hearings outside the presence of a court reporter so I could at least attempt to explain myself at that time. I could not put my mother through anything more than they were already going through. (Exh. T, p. 4.)
Lastly, Your Honor, I would like to say that I do not write you because I am facing disciplinary action by the State Bar. I just want to explain myself, and have wanted to do so for long. Building up the nerve was a huge obstacle. If for nothing else, I hope this letter allows you to understand why I did what I did and that I had no choice. I am a good person, and I believe with every fiber of my being that it is my duty to uphold the integrity of the judicial system and that I am entrusted to maintain the highest veracity to any Court before whom I appear. Please know that I never have, and never will, misrepresent anything to any Court. I cannot say this enough. (Exh. T, p. 4.)
Respondent‟s many acts of dishonesty, both during and after the underlying misconduct in this matter, are a serious aggravating factor.
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Lack of Remorse and Insight
Standard 1.2(b)(v) provides as an aggravating circumstance that the member demonstrated indifference toward rectification of or atonement for the consequences of his or her misconduct.
Respondent fails to demonstrate any realistic recognition of or remorse for his wrongdoings and instead continues to assert that his conduct was justified. Throughout this proceeding, he has denied culpability for any wrongdoing and has argued the reasonableness of his conduct. In the face of those actions, his occasional utterances at trial that he feels any remorse for his actions are not particularly persuasive.
“The law does not require false penitence. [Citation.] But it does require that a respondent accept responsibility for his acts and come to grips with his culpability. [Citation.]” (In the Matter of Katz (Review Dept. 1991) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 502, 511.)
Mitigating Circumstances
Respondent bears the burden of proving mitigating circumstances by clear and convincing evidence. (Std. 1.2(e).) The court finds the following with regard to mitigating factors.
No Prior Discipline
Respondent had practiced law in California for slightly more than 10 years prior to the commencement of the instant misconduct. During that span, Respondent had no prior record of discipline. Respondent‟s lengthy tenure of discipline-free practice is entitled to significant weight in mitigation. (Std. 1.2(e)(i); Hawes v. State Bar (1990) 51 Cal.3d 587, 596; In the Matter of Loftus (Review Dept. 2007) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 80, 88.)
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Cooperation
Respondent did not admit culpability in the matter but entered into an extensive stipulation of facts, thereby assisting the State Bar in the prosecution of the case. For such conduct Respondent is entitled to some mitigation. (Std. 1.2(e)(v); see also In the Matter of Riordan (Review Dept. 2007) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 41, 50; cf. In the Matter of Johnson (Review Dept. 2000) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 179, 190 [credit for stipulating to facts but “very limited” where culpability is denied].)
Character Evidence
Respondent presented good character testimony and declarations from a number of individuals, including present and former clients, members of his church, and family members. Respondent is entitled to mitigation for this good character evidence. (Std. 1.2(e)(vi).)
Community Service
Respondent presented significant evidence of community service and pro bono work, which is “a mitigating factor that is entitled to „considerable weight.‟ [Citation.].” (Calvert v. State Bar (1991) 54 Cal.3d 765, 785; In the Matter of Lybbert (Review Dept. 1993) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 297, 305 [10-15 hours per month of volunteer community and church work, counseling people in crisis]; In the Matter of Crane and DePew (Review Dept 1990) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 139, 158.)
DISCUSSION
The purpose of State Bar disciplinary proceedings is not to punish the attorney, but to protect the public, preserve public confidence in the profession, and maintain the highest possible professional standards for attorneys. (Std. 1.3; Chadwick v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d
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103, 111.) In determining the appropriate level of discipline, the court looks first to the standards for guidance. (Drociak v. State Bar (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1085, 1090; In the Matter of Koehler (Review Dept. 1991) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 615, 628.) Although the standards are not binding, they are to be afforded great weight because “they promote the consistent and uniform application of disciplinary measures.” (In re Silverton (2005) 36 Cal.4th 81, 91-92.) Nevertheless, the court is not bound to follow the standards in talismanic fashion. As the final and independent arbiter of attorney discipline, the court is permitted to temper the letter of the law with considerations peculiar to the offense and the offender. (In the Matter of Van Sickle (2006) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 980, 994; Howard v. State Bar (1990) 51 Cal.3d 215, 221-222.) In addition, the court considers relevant decisional law for guidance. (See Snyder v. State Bar (1990) 49 Cal.3d 1302, 1310-1311; In the Matter of Frazier (Review Dept. 1991) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 676, 703.) Ultimately, in determining the appropriate level of discipline, each case must be decided on its own facts after a balanced consideration of all relevant factors. (Connor v. State Bar (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1047, 1059; In the Matter of Oheb (Review Dept. 2006) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 920, 940.)
Standard 2.6 provides that violation of certain provisions of the Business and Professions Code, including sections 6068 and 6103, must result in disbarment or suspension depending on the gravity of the offense or the harm to the victim, with due regard for the purposes of discipline. The State Bar recommends that Respondent be actually suspended for a period of 90 days for his misconduct here.
In view of the many aggravating factors overlying Respondent‟s misconduct, this court agrees with the State Bar‟s recommendation. Integrity and respect for the courts are qualities required of all who wish to practice law in this state. Respondent‟s disobedience of the court‟s
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orders, his lack of remorse, and his many and ongoing acts of dishonesty make clear that strong measures are required to protect the public, the courts, and the profession from further instances of such misconduct by Respondent in the future.
RECOMMENDED DISCIPLINE
Recommended Suspension/Probation
For all of the above reasons, it is recommended that Marc Y. Lazo, Member No. 215998, be suspended from the practice of law for two years; that execution of that suspension be stayed; and that Respondent be placed on probation for two years, with the following conditions:
1. Respondent must be actually suspended from the practice of law for the first ninety (90) days of probation.
2. Respondent must comply with the provisions of the State Bar Act, the Rules of Professional Conduct, and all of the conditions of this probation.
3. Respondent must maintain, with the State Bar‟s Membership Records Office and the State Bar‟s Office of Probation, his current office address and telephone number or, if no office is maintained, an address to be used for State Bar purposes. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6002.1, subd. (a).) Respondent must also maintain, with the State Bar‟s Membership Records Office and the State Bar‟s Office of Probation, his current home address and telephone number. (See Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6002.1, subd. (a)(5).) Respondent‟s home address and telephone number will not be made available to the general public. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6002.1, subd. (d).) Respondent must notify the Membership Records Office and the Office of Probation of any change in any of this information no later than 10 days after the change.
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4. Within thirty (30) days after the effective date of discipline, Respondent must contact the Office of Probation and schedule a meeting with Respondent‟s assigned probation deputy to discuss these terms and conditions of probation and must meet with the probation deputy either in-person or by telephone. During the period of probation, Respondent must promptly meet with the probation deputy as directed and upon request.
5. Respondent must report, in writing, to the State Bar‟s Office of Probation no later than January 10, April 10, July 10 and October 10 of each year or part thereof in which Respondent is on probation (reporting dates).5 However, if Respondent‟s probation begins less than 30 days before a reporting date, Respondent may submit the first report no later than the second reporting date after the beginning of his probation. In each report, Respondent must state that it covers the preceding calendar quarter or applicable portion thereof and certify by affidavit or under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California as follows:
(a) in the first report, whether Respondent has complied with all the provisions of the State Bar Act, the Rules of Professional Conduct, and all other conditions of probation since the beginning of probation; and
(b) in each subsequent report, whether Respondent has complied with all the provisions of the State Bar Act, the Rules of Professional Conduct, and all other conditions of probation during that period.
During the last 20 days of this probation, Respondent must submit a final report covering any period of probation remaining after and not covered by the last quarterly report required under this probation condition. In this final report, Respondent must certify to
5 To comply with this requirement, the required report, duly completed, signed and dated, must be received by the Office of Probation on or before the reporting deadline.
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the matters set forth in subparagraph (b) of this probation condition by affidavit or under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California.
6. Subject to the proper or good faith assertion of any applicable privilege, Respondent must fully, promptly, and truthfully answer any inquiries of the State Bar‟s Office of Probation that are directed to Respondent, whether orally or in writing, relating to whether Respondent is complying or has complied with the conditions of this probation.
7. Within one year after the effective date of the Supreme Court order in this matter, Respondent must attend and satisfactorily complete the State Bar‟s Ethics School and provide satisfactory proof of such completion to the State Bar‟s Office of Probation. This condition of probation is separate and apart from Respondent‟s California Minimum Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) requirements; accordingly, Respondent is ordered not to claim any MCLE credit for attending and completing this course. (Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 3201.)
8. Respondent‟s probation will commence on the effective date of the Supreme Court order imposing discipline in this matter.
9. At the termination of the probation period, if Respondent has complied with all of the terms of his probation, the two-year period of stayed suspension will be satisfied and the suspension will be terminated.
MPRE
It is further recommended that Respondent be ordered to take and pass the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination within one year after the effective date of the Supreme Court order imposing discipline in this matter and provide satisfactory proof of such passage to the State Bar‟s Office of Probation in Los Angeles within the same period. (See Segretti v. State
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Bar (1976) 15 Cal.3d 878, 891, fn. 8.) Failure to do so may result in an automatic suspension. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.10(b).)
California Rules of Court, Rule 9.20
The court recommends that Respondent be ordered to comply with rule 9.20 of the California Rules of Court and perform the acts specified in subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 30 and 40 calendar days, respectively, after the effective date of the Supreme Court order in this matter.6
Costs
It is further recommended that costs be awarded to the State Bar in accordance with section 6086.10 and that such costs be enforceable both as provided in section 6140.7 and as a money judgment. It is also recommended that Respondent be ordered to reimburse the Client Security Fund to the extent that the misconduct in this matter results in the payment of funds and that such payment obligation be enforceable as provided for under Business and Professions Code section 6140.5.
Dated: June _____, 2013
DONALD F. MILES
Judge of the State Bar Court
6 Respondent is required to file a rule 9.20(c) affidavit even if he has no clients to notify on the date the Supreme Court files its order in this proceeding. (Powers v. State Bar (1988) 44 Cal.3d 337, 341.) In addition to being punished as a crime or contempt, an attorney's failure to comply with rule 9.20 is also, inter alia, cause for disbarment, suspension, revocation of any pending disciplinary probation, and denial of an application for reinstatement after disbarment. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.20(d).)

I received an email stating "... looks like you've chosen to ignore my emails and renege on the deal.  You charged an additional $1,297 after the $50 we paid you when the TOTAL amount was supposed to be $1,000.  You should have only charged an additional $950.  Please immediately refund the difference or we will take you to small claims court.  Thank you.

Marc"

As I said before, the original agreement was for $1,297. There was $50 paid at the time of the inspection and the $50 was credited towards the work, making the balance after the job was complete, $1197.

Marc and his Realtor had the disclosure of the termite report which includes the price, for 24 hours before the work was ever started. This is another example of how Marc makes money, by pushing people around.

I do not have the resources to go to court, or the time. I work for a living, Marc send threatening emails. (Sounds like a bully). So, in the interest of time, I just sent him is $297 back when I got the check from escrow. He won.

History is filled with people like Marc like Idi Amin, Napoleon, Hitler, Henry VIII, etc., you get the idea. I guess if he's going to be famous, he'll be in the books with those guys.