Reiss Racing & Restoration George Reiss, John Kimble, Anson Gentry Scammed me for $72,000 on a car restoration Escondido CA

Omar J. Yassin (Bar No. 202779)

oyassin@mvjllp.com

MOKRI VANIS & JONES, LLP

515 South Flower Street, Suite 3600

Los Angeles, California 90071

Telephone:      213.236.3695

Facsimile:       213.236.3696

Attorneys for Plaintiff,

MICHAEL CAMPBELL

 

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

MICHAEL CAMPBELL

                        Plaintiff,

v.

REISS RACING & RESTORATION; REISS/KIMBLE, LLC, a California limited liability company; GEORGE REISS; JOHN KIMBLE; ANSON GENTRY; TODD ROPER; and DOES 1-100, Inclusive,

                         Defendants.

CASE NO.: 

Assigned for all Purposes to:

 

VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR MONEY DAMAGES AND RESTITUTION:

(1)   Breach of Written Contract;

(2)   Breach of Implied Contract;

(3)  Breach of Implied Covenants of Good Faith and Fair Dealing;

(4)  Unjust Enrichment;

(5)  Fraud – Intentional Misrepresentation;

(6)  Fraud – Negligent Misrepresentation;

(7)  Negligence;

(8)  Conversion

(9)  Conspiracy/Aiding & Abetting;

(10) Unlawful and Unfair Business Practices Pursuant to Business & Professions Code §17200, et seq.;

(11) Violation of Consumer Legal Remedies Act Pursuant to Civil Code § 1750, et seq.

 

COMES NOW, Plaintiff, MICHAEL CAMPBELL, an individual, (hereinafter “CAMPBELL” or “Plaintiff”), hereby alleges against REISS RACING & RESTORATION; (hereinafter “REISS RACING”); REISS/KIMBLE, LLC, a California limited liability company; (hereinafter “REISS/KIMBLE”); GEORGE REISS, (hereinafter “GEORGE”); JOHN KIMBLE, (hereinafter “JOHN”); ANSON GENTRY, (hereinafter “ANSON”); and TODD ROPER, (hereinafter “TODD”), and unknown Defendants DOES 1 through 100, and collectively referred to herein as “DEFENDANTS” as follows:

I.
THE PARTIES AND JURISDICTION

(1)       Plaintiff, CAMPBELL is, and has been at all times herein, an individual and resident of the County of Orange, State of California.  CAMPBELL has personally participated in all communications, conduct and actions alleged herein as they relate to this matter and makes such allegations based upon his direct and personal knowledge.  CAMPBELL is the lawful and sole owner of a certain collectors/show vehicle, a 1970 Chevrolet Chevelle, vehicle identification number 136370k150140, (hereinafter “SUBJECT VEHICLE”), which was delivered to the Defendants, and each of them, for the sole purpose of allowing the Defendants to undertake an extensive and complete restoration of the SUBJECT VEHICLE pursuant to agreement of the parties as set forth within the Work Order, dated October 2, 2015, (hereinafter “WORK ORDER”).  A true and correct copy of the WORK ORDER is attached hereto as Exhibit “A.”  Pursuant to the WORK ORDER, the restoration was to be completed on December 20, 2015.  All restoration work on the SUBJECT VEHICLE was to be performed at the Defendants’ place of business in San Diego County.

(2)       Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges herein that Defendant, REISS RACING was and is at all relevant times herein, a business entity of unknown form, believed to be a sole proprietorship owned one of more of the co-defendants, operating under such fictitious business name in the City of Escondido, County of San Diego, California.  Plaintiff is further informed and believes that REISS RACING was and is in the business of classic motor vehicle repair and restoration and it has at various times maintained a business license number 266648 issued by the California Bureau of Automotive Repair – San Diego.  Plaintiff is further informed and believes and thereon alleges that within the past four (4) years REISS RACING has ceased operations under such name and transferred all assets, contracts, obligations, tools, equipment, employees, vehicles, licensures, leases, and all other valuable business assets to one or more of the co-defendants, including REISS/KIMBAL – the entity specifically formed by co-defendants in order to assume all business operations and goodwill that resided with REISS RACING.  Plaintiff is informed and believes that REISS RACING has within the past four (4) years and continuing to this date, maintained its business operations at 2316 Auto Park Way, Escondido, California 92029, (hereinafter “REPAIR SHOP”).  Plaintiff is further informed and believes and thereon alleges that the REPAIR SHOP is owned by co-defendant, GEORGE and/or by a close and immediate family member and that any ownership transfer has been undertaken within the past four (4) years as part of a fraudulent transfer scheme to avoid financial obligations that are owed by the co-defendants, and each of them.  Plaintiff is further informed and believes that co-defendants, REISS/KIMBLE currently operates its business operations from the REPAIR SHOP and that each individual co-defendant was employed at and performed all work and services in connection with the SUBJECT VEHICLE, while at and upon the premises of the REPAIR SHOP and in furtherance and advancement of the scheme and financial benefit of each of the other co-defendants.  Plaintiff is informed and believes and alleges thereon that some portion of the restoration work that was agreed to be performed and undertaken or such work that was not performed on the SUBJECT VEHICLE was undertaken by and under the control of REISS RACING.

(3)       Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that all relevant times herein, Defendant, REISS/KIMBLE was a California limited liability company with its managers comprising of one or more of the individual co-defendants and/or such individuals’ close family relations.  Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that REISS/KIMBLE was formed within the past four (4) years specifically to assume control of all business operations of REISS RACING in an effort to avoid obligations, debts, and liabilities that may have belonged to REISS RACING.  Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that REISS/KIMBLE has assumed all business assets, employees, lease obligations, equipment, tools, parts, vehicles and all other valuable assets that belong to the co-defendants in order to maintain an illusion of separate entity status, when in fact REISS/KIMBLE was intended by its formation and operation to be nothing more than shell entity that continues to be dominated and controlled by the individual co-defendants, GEORGE and JOHN.  Plaintiff is informed and believes and alleges thereon that some portion of the restoration work that was agreed to be performed and undertaken or such work that was not performed on the SUBJECT VEHICLE was undertaken by and under the control of REISS/KIMBLE.

(4)       Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendant, GEORGE is and has at all relevant times been an individual and resident of the County of San Diego.   Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that within the past four (4) years GEORGE has been the owner, principal, manager, officer of co-defendants, REISS RACING and REISS/KIMBLE and that in such capacity was fully aware of, controlled and dominated the actions, conduct and business operations of such companies as well as fully controlled and directed all communications and actions of all employees therein regarding the SUBJECT VEHICLE to and with Plaintiff.

(5)       Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendant, JOHN is and has at all relevant times been an individual and resident of the County of San Diego.  Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that within the past four (4) years JOHN has been the owner, principal, manager, officer of co-defendant of at least the REISS/KIMBLE entity and that in such capacity was fully aware of and controlled and dominated the actions, conduct and business operations of such company as well as fully controlled and directed all communications of all employees therein regarding the SUBJECT VEHICLE to and with Plaintiff.

(6)       Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendant, ANSON is and has at all relevant times been an individual and resident of the County of San Diego. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that within the past four (4) years ANSON has been an employee, agent, representative, or manager of the co-defendants, REISS RACING and/or REISS/KIMBLE.

(7)       Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendant, TODD is and has at all relevant times been an individual and resident of the County of San Diego. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that within the past four (4) years TODD has been an employee, agent, representative, or manager of the co-defendants, REISS RACING and/or REISS/KIMBLE.

(8)       The true names and/or capacities, whether corporate, associate, individual or otherwise, of Defendants named herein as DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, are presently unknown to Plaintiff, who will therefore sue said Defendants by such fictitious names.  Plaintiff herein is informed and believes, and based upon such information and belief, alleges that said Doe Defendants and each of them, were at all material times herein, residents of and/or doing business in, inter alia, the County of San Diego, State of California.  Plaintiff will amend this Complaint when their true names and/or capacities have been ascertained.  Plaintiff is informed and believes and, based upon such information and belief, alleges that each said fictitiously named Defendant is in some manner responsible for the acts, omissions, breaches, incidents, injuries, unauthorized taking, unjust enrichment and/or damages hereinafter alleged, and subject to liability therefore. 

(9)       Plaintiff is informed and believes and, based upon such information and belief, alleges that at all times mentioned herein, each Defendant herein was the officer, managing member, agent, servant, employer, employee, partner, principal, representative, co-conspirator, affiliate and/or conduit of each of the remaining Defendants, and at all times mentioned herein was acting within the course and scope of said relationship, agency, employment, contractual relation or conspiracy and pursuant to said relationship, whether express, implied, ostensible or otherwise.  Further, at any and all times relevant hereto and mentioned herein, each Defendant did affirm, consent, confirm, direct, authorize, ratify, direct and/or order the acts, omissions and/or breaches of each and every one of the remaining Defendants, and each of them, as to each of the acts, omissions and breaches alleged herein.  

(10)     Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereon alleges, that each of the fictitiously named Defendants are responsible for the wrongful acts alleged herein, and are therefore liable to Plaintiff as alleged hereinafter.

(11)     Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereon alleges, that each of the fictitiously named Defendants DOES 1-100, inclusive, are indebted to and/or have caused injury to Plaintiff as alleged in this Complaint, and that Plaintiff's rights against the fictitiously named defendants arise from this indebtedness or wrongdoing.

(12)     Whenever and wherever reference is made in this Complaint to any act or failure to act by a defendant or co-defendant, such allegations and references shall also be deemed to mean the acts and/or failures to act by each Defendant acting individually, jointly and severally.

(13)     Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 395, this Court has jurisdiction over this matter because the parties entered into agreements here and/or same were to be performed here and/or same were breached here and, further, the injuries were incurred here and/or the wrongdoings and events leading up to and giving rise to each cause of action herein occurred here, viz., in the County of San Diego, State of California, i.e., within the jurisdiction of this honorable Court.

II.

FACTS COMMON TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION

(14)     In or about summer of 2015, Plaintiff was introduced to REISS RACING and GEORGE through participation in various informal collector vehicle associations and car enthusiasts’ forums and groups.  Defendants indicated that they were “muscle car” restoration experts and that they also re-built, restored and marketed such custom vehicles throughout California and that they were “experts” within such industry.  Plaintiff, was interested in undertaking the restoration of his SUBJECT VEHICLE at that time and met with and spoke with GEORGE several times and visited the REPAIR SHOP to look at the Defendants’ operations and other sample vehicles which were in various stages of restoration.  Defendants, and each of them, made repeated assurances as to their competence, expertise and specialized skill and knowledge with restoration of classic vehicles similar to the SUBJECT VEHICLE in order to induce and entice Plaintiff to deliver the SUBJECT VEHICLE over to them and subsequently in order to induce Plaintiff to leave the SUBJECT VEHICLE with the Defendants and pay significant additional monies to the Defendants under the false pretense that such additional monies were necessary and that the SUBJECT VEHICLE’s restoration would be timely completed.  At no time did any of the Defendants truthfully relay to Plaintiff their true intentions, i.e., to strip the valuable parts of the SUBJECT VEHICLE for their own use and thereafter seek to hold the SUBJECT VEHICLE hostage so that they could secure additional, unnecessary and unwarranted payments from Plaintiff under the guise of performing additional work on the SUBJECT VEHICLE. 

(15)     Based solely upon the representations made by the Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff agreed to allow Defendants to undertake a detailed and complete restoration of the SUBJECT VEHICLE.  On or about October 2, 2015, Plaintiff delivered the SUBJECT VEHICLE to the Defendants’ REPAIR SHOP and executed the WORK ORDER which provided a total restoration price of $40,000 and project completion date of December 20, 2015.  At the Defendants’ insistence and based upon the Defendants’ repeated promises and assurances of timely completion of the restoration work, Plaintiff paid the entire $40,000 of the original WORK ORDER amount within the first few weeks of October 2015.

(16)     Plaintiff, who at all times resided in Orange County, California, was unable to routinely travel to the REPAIR SHOP to inspect the status and progress of the restoration work and properly assumed that Defendants would undertake the work efficiently and professionally to complete the restoration as they promised.  Unfortunately, as the weeks turned into months, Defendants requested additional monies from Plaintiff under the false guise of requiring additional parts and labor for unanticipated issues and problems that they encountered during what Plaintiff believed was a proper and detailed restoration as Defendants had promised to perform.  Ultimately, Plaintiff paid more than $70,000 to Defendants between October 2015 and December 2017 when Defendant was finally able to retrieve the SUBJECT VEHICLE which was and remains non-operational due to the actions, conduct and outright theft of the SUBJECT VEHICLE’s parts and equipment.

(17)     The SUBJECT VEHICLE remained in the sole and exclusive control of the Defendants from October 2015 – when Plaintiff drove the operating SUBJECT VEHICLE to the REPAIR SHOP, until December 2017 when Plaintiff was forced to retrieve the SUBJECT VEHICLE on the back of a flat-bed tow truck because of its’ incomplete, non-operational and stripped-out condition.  Defendants had promised to complete all of the work within 3 months and yet after more than 27 months the SUBJECT VEHICLE was in complete disarray and not operable.  Defendants repeatedly sought to induce Plaintiff to allow them to continue to hold the SUBJECT VEHICLE through false promises and excuses, all intended to simply string Plaintiff out further and force him to continue to invest into the restoration work.  Defendants’ repeatedly pushed back the completion date with false promises of new firm completion dates and new budgets that would allow them to complete the restoration.

(18)     In truth, however, Defendants never intended to complete the restoration on the SUBJECT VEHICLE as promised.  Instead the Defendants stripped out valuable original parts from the SUBJECT VEHICLE and replaced the stolen parts with salvage parts and in some cases, undertook elaborate efforts to falsify the origin and manufacture of parts in an effort to disguise their scheme. As an example of the Defendants’ egregious conduct, Plaintiff has confirmed with the manufacturer that Defendants, and each of them, installed a counterfeit Hotchkis Adjustable Rear Sport Suspension system into the SUBJECT VEHICLE after falsely representing to the Plaintiff that a newly manufactured authenticate Hotchkis branded rear sport suspension would be installed.  Plaintiff only learned of the counterfeit parts several months after the SUBJECT VEHICLE was retrieved from the Defendants and delivered to Plaintiff’s follow-on repair mechanic who has performed a detailed inspection of the SUBJECT VEHICLE, noting all of the incomplete, shoddy, negligent and defective work that Defendants, and each of them, performed and which will now be required to be replaced and/or re-done at substantial additional cost and expense to Plaintiff.

(19)     On or about December 4, 2017, TODD, with the knowledge and authority of his co-defendants, and each of them, sent Plaintiff a lengthy e-mail wherein instead of simply admitting their scheme and incompetence to Plaintiff and return the SUBJECT VEHICLE, Defendants, and each of them, double-down on their scheme and sought to extort even more than $70,000 which Plaintiff had already paid to them – and demanded that Plaintiff pay an additional $35,000 under the false promise that the restoration would completed within a further seven (7) weeks.  Upon receipt of such “offer” Plaintiff finally accepted that the Defendants were never going to complete the restoration and he was able to retrieve his SUBJECT VEHICLE from the REPAIR SHOP when GEORGE physically pushed the SUBJECT VEHICLE out into the alley as it was and remains non-operational.

(20)     Since retrieving the SUBJECT VEHICLE, Plaintiff has undertaken a complete investigation and review of the SUBJECT VEHICLE and its systems with another properly licensed and experienced mechanic and restoration expert.  Based upon such inspection and evaluation, not only did Defendants fail to undertake and complete the restoration as per the WORK ORDER, the work that was performed was of poor quality, negligently undertaken and in need of replacement or complete removal and reapplication.  Plaintiff reasonably anticipates that the approximate repair and completion of the restoration of the SUBJECT VEHICLE to remedy the defective, incomplete, shoddy and unprofessional work performed by Defendants, to exceed $75,000 as of the date of filing of this lawsuit.

(21)     Among the various incomplete and/defect work items that Defendants failed to properly undertake or complete are the following, presented herein for illustrative purposes and by no means a complete list of the negligently performed or simply incomplete work:

·                Complete body and paint work – Defendants failed to properly sand, prep and paint the SUBJECT VEHICLE – estimated re-work cost to Plaintiff of approximately $10,000 plus the $9,000 already paid to Defendants;

·                New interior – Defendants never complete the interior work, destroyed and damaged the passenger seat; falsified the quality of the carpet installed; never completed the installation of the dash, power windows, power door locks, door panel, kick panels, molding and trim parts – estimated re-work cost to Plaintiff of $3,000 plus the $5,900 already paid to Defendants;

·                “Vintage Air” air conditioning system – Defendants never completed and connected the air conditioning systems and failed to provide all promises parts for the system – Plaintiff has incurred an additional $2,500 to purchase missing parts and complete the system plus the $3,000 already paid to the Defendants;

·                “Dakota” digital gauges – Defendants were to supply and install all gauges into the dash – they never completed the Dakota kit nor installed the dash;

·                Steering and brakes – Defendants did not properly install the system and do no function; brake fluid drips out the steering box and the brake lines have wrong fittings and missing O-rings – Plaintiff has incurred approximately $1,500 in repairs plus the $2,500 already paid to the Defendants;

·                “Northstar” battery – Plaintiff paid $350 for this specific branded battery and had it shipped to the REPAIR SHOW, however when Plaintiff retrieved the SUBJECT VEHICLE it had a Walmart store battery installed;

·                “Nu-Relics” power window motors – Plaintiff purchased and delivered these parts to the Defendants who simply converted such to their own use and sought to install salvage parts instead;

·                Hydratech Systems brand “Show” Hydraboost brake kit – Defendants were specifically paid $1,000 in advance install the new specific brand kit and instead they installed used parts from different manufacturers that do not function;

·                Pioneer Double DIN 2-DIN Touchscreen Car Apple CarPlay system – Defendants never delivered or installed the advanced purchase system and instead left a used, uninstalled system with the SUBJECT VEHICLE;

·                MSD electronic digital ignition system – Defendants were paid in advance for the system but they simply stripped the parts out and replaced with used analog parts;

·                “American Racing” Headers – Defendants were paid $1,750 for the system, but instead installed a used salvage set of headers.

(22)     Plaintiff reasonably estimates that Defendants, and each of them, converted and sought to pass off fake and inferior parts on the SUBJECT VEHICLE worth no less than $5,500 plus the cost of replacement, re-installation and corrections to the defective and inferior parts, the cost of which is currently unknown to Plaintiff and will be presented as an offer of proof at the time of trial in this matter.

(23)     Had Plaintiff been aware of the Defendants’ scheme and true intentions regarding the SUBJECT VEHICLE, he would never had entered into the WORK ORDER nor deliver the SUBJECT VEHICLE to them.  Only after retrieving his vehicle back from the Defendants, did Plaintiff learn of the extent and depth of the deliberate conduct of these Defendants.  Plaintiff has since learned that GEORGE has stated to 3rd parties that he never would have allowed Plaintiff’s SUBJECT VEHICLE to be completed before his own similar vehicle as he did not want anyone to think that GEORGE was copying Plaintiff’s SUBJECT VEHICLE.  Plaintiff further learned that several other former customers of the Defendants have had very similar experiences with the Defendants in poor, incomplete work, demands for additional payments to complete work, false assertions of completion dates and outright theft of parts and/or use of inferior parts in lieu of promised branded parts and systems.  At no time did or could Plaintiff have known of the true intentions and malicious business practices that the Defendants, and each of them had been engaged in nor that the Defendants, and each of them, would undertake such schemes to defraud, cheat and damage the Plaintiff as herein stated.

(24)      As a result of Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff has suffered injuries and damages, legally and proximately caused thereby, in a sum to be proven at trial and currently estimated to be no less than $150,000 plus attorneys’ fees, litigation costs and expert fees and costs anticipated to be incurred in the prosecution of this matter.  Defendants’ conduct has been so shocking, malicious and unlawful such that they should be sanctioned and punished for such fraudulent and abusive conduct, in violation of numerous statutes and regulations designed to protect consumers, like Plaintiff, as set promulgated by the Bureau of Automotive Repair, such that Plaintiff is entitled to additional damages for fraud and statutory penalties and remedies to deter, prevent and punish both the past conduct of these Defendants, and each of them, and to prevent future hardship and injury to other consumers within the state of California.

III.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

(Against REISS RACING and REISS/KIMBLE - for Breach of Written Contract)

            (25)     Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in the above paragraphs 1 through 24, inclusive, and by this reference incorporates the same herein as though fully set forth at length.

(26)     Plaintiff and Defendant, REISS RACING entered into the WORK ORDER on or about October 2, 2015 which contained all relevant terms regarding the restoration work to be performed on the SUBJECT VEHICLE, including payment terms, scope of work, and completion date. Based upon information and belied, Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that the WORK ORDER was subsequently assigned and taken over by REISS/KIMBLE at some point after the WORK ORDER was executed and that REISS/KIMBLE assumed all obligations and liability for the completion and performance of the work that was to be performed and undertaken by the co-defendants. Plaintiff is further informed and believes that all times herein, whether under REISS RACING or REISS/KIMBLE, that ANSON was fully authorized or had such ostensible authority to enter into the WORK ORDER and thereby bind the co-defendants to all obligations, promises and work requirements as set forth therein.

            (27)     Plaintiff has fully performed and satisfied all conditions and requirements of the WORK ORDER by delivering the SUBJECT VEHICLE to Defendants, and each of them; by paying the original contract sum of $40,000 in full; and by making additional, allegedly “required and necessary” payments to the Defendants in excess of approximately $30,000 for additional parts and labor on the SUBJECT VEHICLE.  Plaintiff, at all times herein, acted in good faith and based upon his reasonable belief and expectation that Defendants would honor the terms of the WORK ORDER and comply with all laws, regulations and statutes governing the automotive repair and restoration industry.  Plaintiff has undertaken and faithfully and dutifully complied with and fully performed all obligations required of him pursuant to terms of the WORK ORDER.

            (28)     Defendants, and each of them, have materially breached the terms of the WORK ORDER and their concurrently contractual and legal obligations owed to Plaintiff arising from such contract.  Defendants have deliberately breached the contract by at least each of the following means, rendering the WORK ORDER terminated, void and immediately subjecting the Defendants, and each of them, to damages herein.  Defendants have breached and failed to comply with the contract terms by: (1) Failing to timely undertake and complete the restoration of the SUBJECT VEHICLE within the time provided by the contract; (2) Failing to install agreed upon parts, equipment, systems within the SUBJECT VEHICLE; (3) Failing to undertake the work and services in a professional, competent and expert manner; (4) Converting and replacing parts and equipment with counterfeit and/or salvaged parts and equipment; (5) Seeking, under false pretenses, additional monies for unnecessary work that should have been completed pursuant to the original scope and terms of the WORK ORDER; (6) Failing to replace or otherwise correct and remedy the defective, negligent and poorly performed work upon reasonable demand; (7) Falsely representing that they were at all times duly and properly licensed to perform the work; (8) Refusing to reimburse and refund Plaintiff for all costs incurred in Plaintiff’s ongoing efforts to remedy and correct the defective and negligently performed work.

            (29)     As a sole and direct result of the Defendants, and of their, conduct and actions, Plaintiff has been and continues to suffer harm and injury in the form of monetary damages equal to all amounts paid to the Defendants and all amounts that will be required to remedy, correct and complete the agreed upon restoration work to the SUBJECT VEHICLE.  Plaintiff currently anticipates that his direct financial loss due to the conduct and action of the Defendants, and each of them, is approximately $150,000 plus attorneys’ fees, litigation costs and expert fees and costs anticipated to be incurred in the prosecution of this matter.  Defendants’ conduct has been so shocking, malicious and unlawful such that they should be sanctioned and punished for such fraudulent and abusive conduct, in violation of numerous statutes and regulations designed to protect consumers, like Plaintiff, as set promulgated by the Bureau of Automotive Repair, such that Plaintiff is entitled to additional damages for fraud and statutory penalties and remedies to deter, prevent and punish both the past conduct of these Defendants, and each of them, and to prevent future hardship and injury to other consumers within the state of California.

IV.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

(Against REISS RACING and REISS/KIMBLE - for Breach of Implied Contract)

            (30)     Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in the above paragraphs 1 through 29, inclusive, and by this reference incorporates the same herein as though fully set forth at length.

(31)     In the alternative to the First Cause of Action, above, Plaintiff respectfully also pleads and avers that pursuant to California Civil Code, Section 1619, et seq., a contract may be implied by the conduct of the parties to it.

(32)     As set forth more fully in the incorporated paragraphs above, Plaintiff and REISS RACING entered into an agreement and contract on or about October 2, 2015 which was subsequently assigned to REISS/KIMBLE as acknowledged and confirmed by receipt of payments and communications with such entity to and between Plaintiff, setting forth all of the material and required terms of performance by each party as set forth and incorporated in detail within the paragraphs above.

(33)     Each party intended that a contract be formed and at all times relevant hereto acted as though a contract had been formed and amended as set forth above.  Further, each party knew or had reason to know that the other party would and did interpret the conduct of the other as an agreement to enter into this implied contract as amended hereinabove.  The conduct and relationship of the parties, as well as the circumstances thereto, further evidence this implied contract.

(34)     Plaintiff has performed all duties, obligations, conditions, covenants and promises required to be performed by Plaintiff under the terms of the agreement by: (1) delivering the SUBJECT VEHICLE to Defendants, and each of them; (2) paying the original contract sum of $40,000 in full; and (3) making additional, allegedly “required and necessary” payments to the Defendants in excess of approximately $30,000 for additional parts and labor on the SUBJECT VEHICLE. 

(35)     Defendants have materially and completely breached the terms of the agreement, whether written or implied by their conduct, in at least each of the following ways: (1) Failing to timely undertake and complete the restoration of the SUBJECT VEHICLE within the time provided by the contract; (2) Failing to install agreed upon parts, equipment, systems within the SUBJECT VEHICLE; (3) Failing to undertake the work and services in a professional, competent and expert manner; (4) Converting and replacing parts and equipment with counterfeit and/or salvaged parts and equipment; (5) Seeking, under false pretenses, additional monies for unnecessary work that should have been completed pursuant to the original scope and terms of the WORK ORDER; (6) Failing to replace or otherwise correct and remedy the defective, negligent and poorly performed work upon reasonable demand; (7) Falsely representing that they were at all times duly and properly licensed to perform the work; (8) Refusing to reimburse and refund Plaintiff for all costs incurred in Plaintiff’s ongoing efforts to remedy and correct the defective and negligently performed work.

(36)     As a result of Defendant’s breach, Plaintiff has suffered injuries and damages, legally and proximately caused thereby, in a sum to be proven at trial and currently estimated to be no less than $150,000 plus attorneys’ fees, litigation costs and expert fees and costs anticipated to be incurred in the prosecution of this matter.  Defendants’ conduct has been so shocking, malicious and unlawful such that they should be sanctioned and punished for such fraudulent and abusive conduct, in violation of numerous statutes and regulations designed to protect consumers, like Plaintiff, as set promulgated by the Bureau of Automotive Repair, such that Plaintiff is entitled to additional damages for fraud and statutory penalties and remedies to deter, prevent and punish both the past conduct of these Defendants, and each of them, and to prevent future hardship and injury to other consumers within the state of California.

V.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

(Against All Defendants –

for Breach of Implied Covenants of Good Faith and Fair Dealing)

(37)     Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in the above paragraphs 1 through 36, inclusive, and by this reference incorporates the same herein as though fully set forth at length.

(38)     Contained within the WORK ORDER, as with every contract, were certain implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing whereby Defendants agreed and were required by law to refrain from engaging in any conduct that would deprive Plaintiff of the benefits of their bargain, i.e., completion of the proper, complete and timely restoration of the SUBJECT VEHICLE for the agreed upon cost.  Defendants’ conduct by deliberately and fraudulently undertaken the partial, incomplete and negligently performed restoration as set forth in detail above, directly and materially breached such implied covenants and subjected Plaintiff to damage.

(39)     Defendants furthermore materially breached the implied covenants by at least each of the following conduct and actions: (1) Failing to timely undertake and complete the restoration of the SUBJECT VEHICLE within the time provided by the contract; (2) Failing to install agreed upon parts, equipment, systems within the SUBJECT VEHICLE; (3) Failing to undertake the work and services in a professional, competent and expert manner; (4) Converting and replacing parts and equipment with counterfeit and/or salvaged parts and equipment; (5) Seeking, under false pretenses, additional monies for unnecessary work that should have been completed pursuant to the original scope and terms of the WORK ORDER; (6) Failing to replace or otherwise correct and remedy the defective, negligent and poorly performed work upon reasonable demand; (7) Falsely representing that they were at all times duly and properly licensed to perform the work; (8) Refusing to reimburse and refund Plaintiff for all costs incurred in Plaintiff’s ongoing efforts to remedy and correct the defective and negligently performed work.

(40)     For each of the above and other such violations and breaches of the implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing as may be presented at the time of trial on the merits, Plaintiff is entitled to damages equal to the true complete value and reimbursement of all monies paid to the Defendants, the repair and replacement costs that Plaintiff will incur the complete the restoration of the SUBJECT VEHICLE, and the value for the loss of use and enjoyment of the SUBJECT VEHICLE that he should have benefited from had the work been complete as promised in December 2015. 

(41)     As a result of Defendant’s breach, Plaintiff has suffered injuries and damages, legally and proximately caused thereby, in a sum to be proven at trial and currently estimated to be no less than $150,000 plus attorneys’ fees, litigation costs and expert fees and costs anticipated to be incurred in the prosecution of this matter.  Defendants’ conduct has been so shocking, malicious and unlawful such that they should be sanctioned and punished for such fraudulent and abusive conduct, in violation of numerous statutes and regulations designed to protect consumers, like Plaintiff, as set promulgated by the Bureau of Automotive Repair, such that Plaintiff is entitled to additional damages for fraud and statutory penalties and remedies to deter, prevent and punish both the past conduct of these Defendants, and each of them, and to prevent future hardship and injury to other consumers within the state of California.

VI.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

 (Against All Defendants - for Unjust Enrichment)

            (42)     Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in the above paragraphs 1 through 41, inclusive, and by this reference incorporates the same herein as though fully set forth at length.

            (43)     As set forth hereinabove, Defendants, have individually and collectively worked and schemed together to deprive Plaintiff of his contractual and legal right to have received a proper and complete restoration of the SUBJECT VEHICLE.  Defendants received a direct and substantial benefit, and have unjustly retained such benefit, in the form of not having to complete the restoration as promised and in falsely retaining all monies paid to them by the Plaintiff for the defective, negligent and fraudulent work that had been performed.

            (44)     Plaintiff has incurred an unjust harm and financial loss in the form of the incomplete restoration, actual damages to the SUBJECT VEHICLE which will require repair and further cost.  The Defendants, and each of them, have directly received a substantial net benefit as a result of their poor work undertaken in the restoration, conversion and theft of parts that belong to Plaintiff.  Only Plaintiff has sustained a loss as a result of the conduct of the Defendants since only the Plaintiff has fully performed all contractual and legal obligations imposed upon it to receive the SUBJECT VEHICLE back from the Defendants in the promised and agreed upon fully restored condition.

            (45)     As set forth hereinabove, the conduct of the Defendants, and each of them, is the result of a deliberate and specific plan to unjustly enrich themselves at the sole expense of Plaintiff.  Such conduct is more morally reprehensible and deplorable, as it is in direct violation of the AGREEMENT and cannot be condoned or supported in law or fact.  Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of restitution in the sum equal to all monies paid to the Defendants to date, all costs for repair and completion of the restoration to the SUBJECT VEHICLE, and all costs and expenses incurred in having to bring the instant action.  In addition, the Court should impose upon the Defendants a constructive trust wherein all monies that have been unjustly retained by the Defendants are to be deposited and secured pending resolution of this litigation and entry of the final judgment and order concerning the amount that should be disbursed to Plaintiff to satisfy and remedy their damages incurred as a result of the unjust enrichment by the Defendants, and each of them.

VII.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Against All Defendants – Fraud – Intentional Misrepresentations)

(46)     Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in the above paragraphs 1 through 45, inclusive, and by this reference incorporates the same herein as though fully set forth at length.

            (47)     As set forth hereinabove Plaintiff entered into and maintained at all times herein alleged, an actual business relationship with Defendants in the form a specific contractual relationship controlled by the WORK ORDER.  Defendants, and each of them, were at all relevant times aware of the existence of Plaintiff’s business and contractual relationship with each of them and that Plaintiff had relied upon the material representations regarding the expertise, professionalism, competency and truthfulness of Defendants relayed to Plaintiff in order to both induce him to deliver the SUBJECT VEHICLE to Defendants and then to subsequently induce and convince Plaintiff to pay additional monies to Defendants for unwarranted and false additional work and services that were allegedly required to be performed on the SUBJECT VEHICLE.

            (48)     The Defendants owed to Plaintiff a special duty of care to the extent that they were mutual parties together within the WORK ORDER such that they owed to Plaintiff a contractual duty of fairness and good faith and fair dealing.  Furthermore, as established by the case of J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory, (1979) 24 Cal. 3rd 799, 808, the Defendants each owed to Plaintiff a judicially recognized special duty of care, as all of the elements of such duty have been satisfied herein, including: (1) Defendants’ conduct that was a deliberate scheme undertaken in direct violation of the statutory duties of care imposed by the BAR rules and regulations regarding the bailment and performance of vehicle repair and restoration services; (2) The adverse and negative impact on Plaintiff was clearly foreseeable; i.e., as a result of Defendants’ conduct alleged herein, they clearly knew and foresaw the damage that would result to Plaintiff; (3) Plaintiff sustained damage and injuries; i.e., the loss of use and incomplete and defective nature of the restoration work that was partially completed on the SUBJECT VEHICLE; (4) Defendants’ acts and conduct were closely and directly related to Plaintiff’s interest in the SUBJECT VEHICLE such that their wrongful conduct did result in the direct and negative damage to Plaintiff; i.e., the entire relationship and foreseeable damages arose directly and solely from the WORK ORDER and the statutes and regulations imposed upon the Defendants; (5) Defendants’ conduct was particularly blameworthy as Defendants intended and specifically knew and expected to damage and harm Plaintiff as a result of their schemes and plans; (6) Public policy favors the enforcement of valid contracts and in holding parties to their promises such that allowing Defendants to breach their contractual obligations is grounds for discipline and punishment; (7) Public policy favors the enforcement of this State’s consumer protection regulations and the proper management and regulation of automotive repair and restorations businesses in this State and specifically within the County of San Diego.

            (49)     Defendants and each of them, either directly made or with full knowledge and awareness of such statements, specifically and falsely represented to Plaintiff at least each of the following materially false representations: (1) their knowledge, skill and expertise with regard to the repair and restoration of similar vehicles to the SUBJECT VEHICLE; (2) their ability to complete the restoration work within the agreed upon promised completion dates; (3) that additional work and services were required to complete the SUBJECT VEHICLE restoration; (4) that all work allegedly performed in furtherance of the restoration work was necessary and properly, professionally and competently performed; (5) that all requests for additional payment from the Plaintiff was necessary and for the sole benefit of the restoration work to the SUBJECT VEHICILE; (6) that all credit card charges were proper and related to work necessarily performed on the SUBJECT PROPERTY; (7) that all parts, equipment and systems supplied by Plaintiff would be timely, properly and professionally installed into the SUBJECT VEHICLE; (8) that all special ordered parts and systems would be purchased, supplied and installed into the SUBJECT VEHICLE; (9) that all specially branded parts and equipment would be supplied and installed into the SUBECT VEHICLE; and (10) that all work and services performed by Defendants would be properly warranted.

            (50)     Plaintiff relied upon each of these specific representations and promises which were intentionally and knowingly made to Plaintiff by the Defendants, including GEORGE, JOHN, ANSON, and TODD at various times between August 2015 and December 2017.  Plaintiff had no way to know nor to learn of the materially false nature of each representation until only after he had detrimentally relied upon such statement and representations such that he was too far into the work such that he believed he was compelled to complete the restoration work with the Defendants – exactly as Defendants, and each of them, intended.  Plaintiff later learned that each of Defendants’ intentional representations were false and baseless, including: (1) that Defendants were in fact incompetent, at various time not properly licensed, and otherwise unable to undertake the promised for repair and restoration work; (2) that Defendants never had any intention of completing the restoration work on the SUBECT VEHICLE as per the terms of the WORK ORDER; (3) that Defendants had a specific business practice of falsely inducing customers to deliver their vehicles to the Defendants who would then demand additional monies from the customers, including Plaintiff, by holding their vehicles hostage until additional monies were paid; (4) that Defendants would strip original and newly purchased parts from the SUBJECT VEHICLE and replace such stolen parts with salvage and inferior parts and equipment; (5) that Defendants would not honor their warranties and otherwise seek to fabricate excuses for their poor and defective work.

            (51)     Defendants, and each of them made the various representations above with the specific intent and desire to induce Plaintiff’s reliance and then subsequently to keep Plaintiff entangled and ensnared with the Defendants’ scheme.  Defendants and each of them, conspired with their co-defendants in making the representations and in authorizing, condoning and supporting such representations with each other.  Defendants knew at the time of making such representations that such statements and representations were false and that despite such knowledge of the falsity of the representations made then anyway with the full expectation and intention that Plaintiff would rely upon such representations to his detriment and in furtherance of the Defendants’ scheme.

            (52)     Plaintiff did in fact believe and rely upon Defendants’ representations to his damage as set forth herein.  As set forth hereinabove, the conduct of the Defendants, and each of them, is the result of a deliberate and specific plan to unjustly enrich themselves at the sole expense of Plaintiff.  Such conduct is more morally reprehensible and deplorable, as it is in direct violation of the WORK ORDER and cannot be condoned or supported in law or fact.  Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of restitution in the sum equal to all monies paid to the Defendants to date, all costs for repair and completion of the restoration to the SUBJECT VEHICLE, and all costs and expenses incurred in having to bring the instant action.  In addition, the Court should impose upon the Defendants a constructive trust wherein all monies that have been unjustly retained by the Defendants are to be deposited and secured pending resolution of this litigation and entry of the final judgment and order concerning the amount that should be disbursed to Plaintiff to satisfy and remedy their damages incurred as a result of the unjust enrichment by the Defendants, and each of them.            

(53)     As a result of Defendant’s breach, Plaintiff has suffered injuries and damages, legally and proximately caused thereby, in a sum to be proven at trial and currently estimated to be no less than $150,000 plus attorneys’ fees, litigation costs and expert fees and costs anticipated to be incurred in the prosecution of this matter.  Defendants’ conduct has been so shocking, malicious and unlawful such that they should be sanctioned and punished for such fraudulent and abusive conduct, in violation of numerous statutes and regulations designed to protect consumers, like Plaintiff, as set promulgated by the Bureau of Automotive Repair, such that Plaintiff is entitled to additional damages for fraud and statutory penalties and remedies to deter, prevent and punish both the past conduct of these Defendants, and each of them, and to prevent future hardship and injury to other consumers within the state of California.

/ / /

VIII.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Against All Defendants – Fraud – Negligent Misrepresentations)

(54)     Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in the above paragraphs 1 through 53, inclusive, and by this reference incorporates the same herein as though fully set forth at length.

            (55)     As set forth hereinabove Plaintiff entered into and maintained at all times herein alleged, an actual business relationship with Defendants in the form a specific contractual relationship controlled by the WORK ORDER.  Defendants, and each of them, were at all relevant times aware of the existence of Plaintiff’s business and contractual relationship with each of them and that Plaintiff had relied upon the material representations regarding the expertise, professionalism, competency and truthfulness of Defendants relayed to Plaintiff in order to both induce him to deliver the SUBJECT VEHICLE to Defendants and then to subsequently induce and convince Plaintiff to pay additional monies to Defendants for unwarranted and false additional work and services that were allegedly required to be performed on the SUBJECT VEHICLE.

            (56)     The Defendants owed to Plaintiff a special duty of care to the extent that they were mutual parties together within the WORK ORDER such that they owed to Plaintiff a contractual duty of fairness and good faith and fair dealing.  Furthermore, as established by the case of J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory, (1979) 24 Cal. 3rd 799, 808, the Defendants each owed to Plaintiff a judicially recognized special duty of care, as all of the elements of such duty have been satisfied herein, including: (1) Defendants’ conduct that was a deliberate scheme undertaken in direct violation of the statutory duties of care imposed by the BAR rules and regulations regarding the bailment and performance of vehicle repair and restoration services; (2) The adverse and negative impact on Plaintiff was clearly foreseeable; i.e., as a result of Defendants’ conduct alleged herein, they clearly knew and foresaw the damage that would result to Plaintiff; (3) Plaintiff sustained damage and injuries; i.e., the loss of use and incomplete and defective nature of the restoration work that was partially completed on the SUBJECT VEHICLE; (4) Defendants’ acts and conduct were closely and directly related to Plaintiff’s interest in the SUBJECT VEHICLE such that their wrongful conduct did result in the direct and negative damage to Plaintiff; i.e., the entire relationship and foreseeable damages arose directly and solely from the WORK ORDER and the statutes and regulations imposed upon the Defendants; (5) Defendants’ conduct was particularly blameworthy as Defendants intended and specifically knew and expected to damage and harm Plaintiff as a result of their schemes and plans; (6) Public policy favors the enforcement of valid contracts and in holding parties to their promises such that allowing Defendants to breach their contractual obligations is grounds for discipline and punishment; (7) Public policy favors the enforcement of this State’s consumer protection regulations and the proper management and regulation of automotive repair and restorations businesses in this State and specifically within the County of San Diego.

            (57)     Defendants and each of them, either directly made or with full knowledge and awareness of such statements, specifically and negligently represented to Plaintiff at least each of the following materially false representations: (1) their knowledge, skill and expertise with regard to the repair and restoration of similar vehicles to the SUBJECT VEHICLE; (2) their ability to complete the restoration work within the agreed upon promised completion dates; (3) that additional work and services were required to complete the SUBJECT VEHICLE restoration; (4) that all work allegedly performed in furtherance of the restoration work was necessary and properly, professionally and competently performed; (5) that all requests for additional payment from the Plaintiff was necessary and for the sole benefit of the restoration work to the SUBJECT VEHICLE; (6) that all credit card charges were proper and related to work necessarily performed on the SUBJECT PROPERTY; (7) that all parts, equipment and systems supplied by Plaintiff would be timely, properly and professionally installed into the SUBJECT VEHICLE; (8) that all special ordered parts and systems would be purchased, supplied and installed into the SUBJECT VEHICLE; (9) that all specially branded parts and equipment would be supplied and installed into the SUBECT VEHICLE; and (10) that all work and services performed by Defendants would be properly warranted.  When the Defendants, and each of them, made these representations they knew or should have known of the falsity of such representations and they made such representations in spite of and regardless of such knowledge.

            (58)     Plaintiff relied upon each of these specific representations and promises which were negligently made to Plaintiff by the Defendants, including GEORGE, JOHN, ANSON, and TODD at various times between August 2015 and December 2017.  Plaintiff had no way to know nor to learn of the materially false nature of each representation until only after he had detrimentally relied upon such statement and representations such that he was too far into the work such that he believed he was compelled to complete the restoration work with the Defendants – exactly as Defendants, and each of them, intended, expected or should have known would result from making such representations in the first instance.  Plaintiff later learned that each of Defendants’ representations were false and baseless, and/or that Defendants could not have reasonably suspected such representations to be truthful would made to the Plaintiff, including: (1) that Defendants were in fact incompetent, at various time not properly licensed, and otherwise unable to undertake the promised for repair and restoration work; (2) that Defendants were not capable of completing the restoration work on the SUBECT VEHICLE as per the terms of the WORK ORDER; (3) that Defendants would negligently and incompetently undertake an perform the scope of work set forth within the WORK ORDER; and (4) that Defendants could not honor their warranties and otherwise seek to fabricate excuses for their poor and defective work.

            (59)     Defendants, and each of them made the various representations above with the intent to induce or should have known that their representations would serve and work to induce Plaintiff’s reliance and then subsequently serve to keep Plaintiff entangled and ensnared with the Defendants’ scheme.  Defendants and each of them, conspired with their co-defendants in making the representations and in authorizing, condoning and supporting such representations with each other.  Defendants knew at the time of making such representations that such statements and representations were false or should have reasonably known and suspected that such statements and representations would be false and that despite such knowledge of the falsity of the representations made then anyway with the full expectation and intention that Plaintiff would rely upon such representations to his detriment and in furtherance of the Defendants’ scheme.

            (60)     Plaintiff did in fact believe and rely upon Defendants’ representations to his damage as set forth herein.  As set forth hereinabove, the conduct of the Defendants, and each of them, is the result of a deliberate and specific plan to unjustly enrich themselves at the sole expense of Plaintiff.  Such conduct is more morally reprehensible and deplorable, as it is in direct violation of the WORK ORDER and cannot be condoned or supported in law or fact.  Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of restitution in the sum equal to all monies paid to the Defendants to date, all costs for repair and completion of the restoration to the SUBJECT VEHICLE, and all costs and expenses incurred in having to bring the instant action.  In addition, the Court should impose upon the Defendants a constructive trust wherein all monies that have been unjustly retained by the Defendants are to be deposited and secured pending resolution of this litigation and entry of the final judgment and order concerning the amount that should be disbursed to Plaintiff to satisfy and remedy their damages incurred as a result of the unjust enrichment by the Defendants, and each of them.            

(61)     As a result of Defendant’s breach, Plaintiff has suffered injuries and damages, legally and proximately caused thereby, in a sum to be proven at trial and currently estimated to be no less than $150,000 plus attorneys’ fees, litigation costs and expert fees and costs anticipated to be incurred in the prosecution of this matter.  Defendants’ conduct has been so shocking, malicious and unlawful such that they should be sanctioned and punished for such fraudulent and abusive conduct, in violation of numerous statutes and regulations designed to protect consumers, like Plaintiff, as set promulgated by the Bureau of Automotive Repair, such that Plaintiff is entitled to additional damages for fraud and statutory penalties and remedies to deter, prevent and punish both the past conduct of these Defendants, and each of them, and to prevent future hardship and injury to other consumers within the state of California.

IX.

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Against All Defendants – Negligence)

(62)     Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in the above paragraphs 1 through 61, inclusive, and by this reference incorporates the same herein as though fully set forth at length.

(63)     Plaintiff entrusted and delivered the SUBJECT VEHICLE to the Defendants, and each of them, for the sole purpose and expectation that the restoration work would be timely and properly completed as per the terms of the WORK ORDER and in the manner consistent with professional automotive and restoration standards.  Plaintiff relied upon the Defendants’ expertise in carrying out the agreed upon work and other than providing specific parts and equipment that Defendants confirmed would be appropriate to be incorporated into the restoration of the SUBJECT VEHICLE, Plaintiff did not participate in the restoration in any way.  Plaintiff left all details of the restoration to the Defendants and expected that Defendants would undertake and complete their work in a timely and professional manner. 

(64)     Defendants, and each of their, work and services are governed and controlled by accepted industry standards and specific statutory and regulatory rules and codes of conduct promulgated by the State of California as set forth within the Business & Professions Code and as confirmed within the licensure requirements maintained by the State of California Bureau of Automotive Repairs.

(65)     Such rules, industry standards and regulations establish the general duty of care owed by the Defendants to the Plaintiff in the performance and completion of the restoration work on the SUBJECT VEHICLE.  Defendants, and each of them, breached and violated such legal duties owed to Plaintiff in each of the following ways: negligently and defectively undertaking the restoration by failing to properly and competently performing the body work and preparation; defectively painting; and defectively, incompletely and negligently performing the required and necessary mechanical repairs required to ensure that the SUBJECT VEHICLE was returned to Plaintiff in a complete and operational condition.

(66)     As a result of Defendants, and each of them, conduct, Plaintiff has been damaged in the return of his inoperable and damaged SUBJECT VEHICLE.  Plaintiff has been and will in the future be required to expend considerable additional funds, over and above the approximately $70,000 paid to the Defendants, to repair, remediate and complete the restoration work on the SUBJECT VEHICLE that Defendants were obligated to perform.  Defendants have no defense for their poor and negligent workmanship, quality of the work performed, nor basis for why the restoration project was left incomplete when the SUBJECT VEHICLE was finally released back to the Plaintiff after 27 months during which time the SUBJECT VEHICLE was within the sole control and custody of the Defendants.

(67)     As a result of Defendant’s negligence, Plaintiff has suffered injuries and damages, legally and proximately caused thereby, in a sum to be proven at trial and currently estimated to be no less than $150,000 plus attorneys’ fees, litigation costs and expert fees and costs anticipated to be incurred in the prosecution of this matter.  Defendants’ conduct has been so shocking, malicious and unlawful such that they should be sanctioned and punished for such fraudulent and abusive conduct, in violation of numerous statutes and regulations designed to protect consumers, like Plaintiff, as set promulgated by the Bureau of Automotive Repair, such that Plaintiff is entitled to additional damages for fraud and statutory penalties and remedies to deter, prevent and punish both the past conduct of these Defendants, and each of them, and to prevent future hardship and injury to other consumers within the state of California.

X.

EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Against All Defendants – Conversion)

(68)     Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in the above paragraphs 1 through 67, inclusive, and by this reference incorporates the same herein as though fully set forth at length.

(69)     In furtherance of the restoration to the SUBJECT VEHICLE, Plaintiff specially purchased and delivered into Defendants’ possession various parts and equipment to be installed into the SUBJECT VEHICLE by the Defendants.  In addition, the SUBJECT VEHICLE was delivered with various parts and systems which were to remain with the SUBJECT VEHICLE and at no time be taken or given to the Defendants.  Among the various parts and equipment that was at all times the sole property and possession of the Plaintiff, specially purchased or already contained with the SUBJECT VEHICLE and intended to be incorporated into the SUBJECT VEHICLE as part of the restoration were at least the following parts: (1) FAST EFI system; (2) Northstar Battery; (3) MSD electrical ignition system and distributor; (4) steering column, 64-65 A-Body, floor shift, chrome; (5) hood adjuster lightning (EA)SS 5/16-inch polish; (6) billet cup holders; (7) fender braces; (8) billet plug wire separators; (9) Eddie Motorsports hood latch assembly MS276-12P; (10) Eddie Motorsports MS274-19P door lock knobs; (11) ash tray springs; (12) license lamp assembly; (13) knobs, door lock 68-88 GM, Billet aluminum; (14) 68-72 headliner side trim; (15) Headlamp; (16) armrest base screw kit; (17) 1970 ignition/doors/glovebox/trunk lock set.  Plaintiff reasonably believes that the above known taken items have a replacement value of approximately $7,500.

(70)     All of the above described parts and equipment were either physically present and attached to the SUBJECT VEHICLE when it was delivered to the Defendants at the REPAIR SHOP or were specifically purchased and delivered to the Defendants by the Plaintiff during the course of the restoration period of October 2015 through December 2017.  At no time did Plaintiff relinquish ownership of these parts and systems which were at all times intended to be attached and incorporated into the final completed restoration of the SUBJECT VEHICLE.

(71)     Plaintiff has inspected the SUBJECT VEHICLE as it was returned to Plaintiff in December 2017 and has determined that none of the above-identified parts and systems have been incorporated into the SUBJECT VEHICLE or otherwise returned to Plaintiff.  Plaintiff has made repeated demand for the return of these parts and tangible items to the Defendants.

(72)     Defendants have refused to return any of the above-described parts and tangible items.  Defendants have refused to reimburse Plaintiff for the monetary value of such parts and tangible items.  Defendants have continued to exercise dominion and control over the above-described parts and tangible items even though they have no right or ownership interest in such parts and tangible items.

(73)      Because of Defendants’ conduct and action in converting and continuing to hold without any basis or legal right to retain control of such parts and tangible items as described hereinabove, Plaintiff has and continues to sustain direct harm and damage.  Defendants’ continued exercise and control over the parts and items is in direct and intentional opposition to Plaintiff’s sole lawful control and right to possess such items and therefore is a direct and willful occupancy and exercise of dominion over such items in direct contravention and to the exclusive damage and peril of the Plaintiff.

(74)     Plaintiff has sustained and continues to suffer direct financial damage equal to the value of the above-described parts and/or their reasonable and necessary replacement value.  Demand for such recovery of the parts and/or their reasonable value has been presented to the Defendants, who to date refuse to respond or otherwise return the parts and tangible items which the Defendants, and each of them, knowingly and intentionally have taken and continue to exercise control over to the sole and exclusive harm of the Plaintiff.

XI.

NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Against All Defendants – Conspiracy – Aiding and Abetting)

(75)     Plaintiff repeats and realleges each allegation contained in the above paragraphs 1 through 74, inclusive, and by this reference incorporates the same herein as though fully set forth at length.

(76)     Defendants, and each of them have together and for their mutual benefit and for their sole collective financial gain, have undertaken and knowingly participated in a scheme to defraud Plaintiff and to deny Plaintiff, and other customers, of their rights to enjoy their property and to unlawfully and illegally conspire with one another to violate various laws and regulations of this state regarding the operations and conduct of automotive repair businesses as regulated and controlled by the Bureau of Automotive Repair.  Among the joint and collective actions and conduct undertaken by each of the co-defendants, and specifically the individual defendants, GEORGE, JOHN, ANSON, and TODD in furtherance of the business operations of co-defendants, REISS RACING and REISS/KIMBLE: (1) agreeing upon false and misleading terms and representations regarding their competency in connection with performing restoration work as set forth within the WORK ORDER; (2) agreeing upon and mutually assisting each other in communicating with Plaintiff regarding the status of the work, the alleged need for additional services and parts and labor when such statements were known to be false; (3) agreeing and mutually assisting one another in attempting to hold the SUBJECT VEHICLE at the REPAIR SHOP for longer than necessary in order to entice Plaintiff to continue to send money for unnecessary and unwarranted work; (4) agreeing and mutually assisting each other in removing and replacing parts intended for the SUBJECT VEHICLE and replacing such parts with inferior used parts; and (5) agreeing and working with each other to intentionally attempt to disguise counterfeit parts as being original to a specific manufacturer, including placement of fabricated markings and manufacturer stickers on the parts in an effort to pass them off to the Plaintiff as being genuine.

(77)     Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that the Defendants, and each of them, knowingly participated in such scheme and actively discussed the above schemes in order to collaborate and mutually assist each of the other defendants in their collective effort to defraud and cheat the Plaintiff.  Defendants knew or should have known at the time that such conspiracy was developed and continued that such was wrongful, illegal and in violation of their respective licensures.  Defendants nonetheless continued with their mutual aid in order to continue the fraud and to extract additional unwarranted monies from the Plaintiff for services that were not necessary and for parts and restoration work that was poorly and defectively performed.

(78)     In conjunction with and/or as an alternative to the damages sought by each cause of action asserted herein, Plaintiff seeks additional damages, to be determined and set at the time of trial, against each Defendant based upon their conspiracy and deliberate efforts to aid and assist each other in perfecting the ongoing fraudulent scheme.  Defendants’ conduct is morally unjustified and evidence of the depraved and intentionally evil spirit and intent by which the Defendants, and each of them, undertook to deny Plaintiff of the beneficial rights to his SUBJECT VEHICLE and confirm the degree and depravity by which the Defendants selected, targeted and then sought to defraud Plaintiff and others like him throughout this State. 

XII.

TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Against All Defendants – Unlawful and Illegal Business Practices in Violation of Business & Professions Code Section 17200, et. seq.)

(79)     Plaintiff repeats and realleges each allegation contained in the above paragraphs 1 through 78, inclusive, and by this reference incorporates the same herein as though fully set forth at length.

(80)     Plaintiff is suing under this cause of action on behalf of himself, all other similarly situated customers of the Defendants and the general public.

(81)     The acts of the Defendants, and each of them described herein occurred while doing business in the State of California.

(82)     Within the past four (4) years, Defendants and each of them have committed the unfair business practices as alleged herein, specifically paragraphs 1 through 78, for the sole purpose and intent of cheating and defrauding the Plaintiff and the public at general regarding the Defendants’ services and work performed under license by the Bureau of Automotive Repair.

(83)     Plaintiff is informed and believes and based thereon alleges that the Defendants, and each of them, have engaged in similar unfair business practices with members of the general public and specifically other customers who have delivered classic vehicles to the Defendants for the purpose of restoration and repairs.

(84)     Defendants’ conduct is likely to deceive and in fact did result in the deceit and financial harm and injury to the Plaintiff and is intended and likely will mislead and deceive the general public, and thus Defendants’ actions constitute an unfair and fraudulent business practice within the meaning of California Business and Professions Code Section 17200, et seq.

(85)     As a direct, proximate and foreseeable result of the Defendants’ wrongful conduct, Plaintiff has suffered injury in fact and has been harmed in an amount according to proof, reasonably estimated to be no less than $150,000.

(86)     Plaintiff is entitled to relief, including full restitution and/or disgorgement of all commissions, earnings, profits and benefits that may have been obtained by Defendants as a result of such unfair business practices, as well as an injunction to prevent Defendants from engaging in such unfair and fraudulent business practices in the future.

XIII.

ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Against All Defendants – Violation of Consumer Legal Remedies Act – Civil Code Section 1750, et. seq.)

(87)     Plaintiff repeats and realleges each allegation contained in the above paragraphs 1 through 86, inclusive, and by this reference incorporates the same herein as though fully set forth at length.

(88)     Plaintiff is suing under this cause of action on behalf of himself, all other similarly situated customers of the Defendants and the general public.

(89)     The acts of the Defendants, and each of them described herein occurred while doing business in the State of California.

(90)     Within the past four (4) years, Defendants and each of them have committed the unfair business practices as alleged herein, specifically paragraphs 1 through 78, for the sole purpose and intent of cheating and defrauding the Plaintiff and the public at general regarding the Defendants’ services and work performed under license by the Bureau of Automotive Repair.  All of the alleged conduct relates to work and services performed by the Defendants, and each of them, related to consumer products, services, goods and related activities performed to and with the context of professional services performed for pay to consumers in this State and specifically within the County of San Diego.  Each of the complained of services, conduct and action by the Defendants was undertaken despite the Defendants’ knowledge and awareness that such acts were illegal and in violation of various statutory and regulatory rules promulgated by the Bureau of Automotive Repair and such other statutes, rules, and regulations and laws of the State of California.

(91)     Plaintiff is informed and believes and based thereon alleges that the Defendants, and each of them, have engaged in similar unfair business practices with members of the general public and specifically other customers who have delivered classic vehicles to the Defendants for the purpose of restoration and repairs.

(92)     Defendants’ conduct is likely to deceive and in fact did result in the deceit and financial harm and injury to the Plaintiff and is intended and likely will mislead and deceive the general public, and thus Defendants’ actions constitute an unfair and fraudulent business practice within the meaning of California Business and Professions Code Section 17200, et seq.

(93)     As a direct, proximate and foreseeable result of the Defendants’ wrongful conduct, Plaintiff has suffered injury in fact and has been harmed in an amount according to proof, reasonably estimated to be no less than $150,000.

(94)     Plaintiff is entitled to relief, including full restitution and/or disgorgement of all commissions, earnings, profits and benefits that may have been obtained by Defendants as a result of such unfair business practices, as well as an injunction to prevent Defendants from engaging in such unfair and fraudulent business practices in the future.

XIV.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants, and each of them, as follows:

 

On the First Cause of Action for Breach of Written Contract:

1.              That Defendants, and each of them, are liable to Plaintiff for all breach of contract damages, including the amounts paid to the Defendants and all remediation costs and expenses to be incurred to remedy Defendants’ work, plus all costs incurred in the enforcement of this action;

2.              For compensatory damages according to proof;

3.              For attorneys’ fees pursuant to contract or statute;

4.              For costs of suit incurred herein; and

 

On the Second Cause of Action for Breach of Implied Contract:

1.              That Defendants, and each of them, are liable to Plaintiff for all breach of contract damages, including the amounts paid to the Defendants and all remediation costs and expenses to be incurred to remedy Defendants’ work, plus all costs incurred in the enforcement of this action;

2.              For compensatory damages according to proof;

3.              For attorneys’ fees pursuant to contract or statute;

4.              For costs of suit incurred herein; and

 

On the Third Cause of Action for Breach of Implied Covenants of Good Faith and Fair Dealing:

1.              That Defendants, and each of them, are liable to Plaintiff for all breach of contract damages, including the amounts paid to the Defendants and all remediation costs and expenses to be incurred to remedy Defendants’ work, plus all costs incurred in the enforcement of this action;

2.              For compensatory damages according to proof;

3.              For attorneys’ fees pursuant to contract or statute;

4.              For costs of suit incurred herein; and

 

On the Fourth Cause of Action for Unjust Enrichment:

1.              For compensatory damages according to proof equal to the total amount that Defendants have been unjustly enriched at the expense of the Plaintiff;

2.              For costs of suit incurred herein; and

 

On the Fifth Cause of Action for Fraud – Intentional Misrepresentations:

1.              For compensatory damages according to proof equal to the total amount that Defendants have caused in monies paid to the Defendant, all repair costs and expenses, loss of economic advantage and business opportunity loss incurred as a result of Defendants’ conduct;

2.              For damages in an amount sufficient to punish, deter, and prevent Defendants from engaging in similar conduct and business practices with others;

3.              For costs of suit incurred herein; and

 

On the Sixth Cause of Action for Fraud – Negligent Misrepresentations:

1.              For compensatory damages according to proof equal to the total amount that Defendants have caused in monies paid to the Defendant, all repair costs and expenses, loss of economic advantage and business opportunity loss incurred as a result of Defendants’ conduct;

2.              For damages in an amount sufficient to punish, deter, and prevent Defendants from engaging in similar conduct and business practices with others;

3.              For costs of suit incurred herein; and

 

On the Seventh Cause of Action for Negligence:

1.              For compensatory damages according to proof equal to the total amount that Defendants have caused in monies paid to the Defendant, all repair costs and expenses, loss of economic advantage and business opportunity loss incurred as a result of Defendants’ conduct;

2.              For costs of suit and attorney’s fees is recoverable pursuant to contract or statute;

3.              For further relief as the Court may deem just and proper; and

 

On the Eighth Cause of Action for Conversion:

1.              For an amount equal to the value of all parts, items and tangible things that Defendants have exerted control over to the exclusive damage of the Plaintiff;

2.              For costs of suit and attorney’s fees is recoverable pursuant to contract or statute;

3.              For further relief as the Court may deem just and proper; and

 

On the Ninth Cause of Action for Conspiracy:

1.              For compensatory damages according to proof equal to the total amount that Defendants have caused in monies paid to the Defendant, all repair costs and expenses, loss of economic advantage and business opportunity loss incurred as a result of Defendants’ conduct;

2.              For damages in an amount sufficient to punish, deter, and prevent Defendants from engaging in similar conduct and business practices with others;

3.              For costs of suit incurred herein; and

 

On the Tenth Cause of Action for Unlawful and Unfair Business Practices in Violation of Business & Professions Code Section 17200, et seq.:

1.              For compensatory damages according to proof equal to the total amount that Defendants have caused in monies paid to the Defendant, all repair costs and expenses, loss of economic advantage and business opportunity loss incurred as a result of Defendants’ conduct;

2.              For restitution and disgorgement of all profits, payments, compensation, commissions of any kind received by the Defendants, and each of them;

3.              For statutory attorneys’ fees;

4.              For the imposition of a constructive trust on behalf of the general public into which Defendants’ disgorged profits should be deposited and distributed by the State of California to the affected and impacted customers of the Defendants;

5.              For costs of suit incurred herein; and

 

On the Tenth Cause of Action for Violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act pursuant to Civil Code Section 1750, et seq.:

1.              For compensatory damages according to proof equal to the total amount that Defendants have caused in monies paid to the Defendant, all repair costs and expenses, loss of economic advantage and business opportunity loss incurred as a result of Defendants’ conduct;

2.              For restitution and disgorgement of all profits, payments, compensation, commissions of any kind received by the Defendants, and each of them;

3.              For statutory attorneys’ fees;

4.              For the imposition of a constructive trust on behalf of the general public into which Defendants’ disgorged profits should be deposited and distributed by the State of California to the affected and impacted customers of the Defendants;

5.              For costs of suit incurred herein; and

 

 

 

 

Dated: June _____, 2018

 

MOKRI VANIS & JONES, LLP

 

Omar J. Yassin

Attorneys for Plaintiff,

MICHAEL CAMPBELL

 

VERIFICATION

I, Michael Campbell, have read the Verified Complaint for Monetary Damages and Restitution filed on my behalf.  The matters stated in the Verified Complaint are true based either upon my own knowledge or information and belief as to the truth of those matters.