Cornell & Associates, P.A. G. Ware Cornell, Jr. Client Review - G. Ware Cornell, Jr. Weston, Florida

Client Review of G. Ware Cornell, Jr. - Weston, FL Mr. Cornell filed three lawsuits over a three year period on my behalf against a multi-billion dollar corporation involving the same common nucleus of operative facts, the same cast of characters, the same collection of allegations and circumstances, and requesting the exact same damages by splitting the defendants. There should have been only one lawsuit that included all of the defendants. The second and third lawsuits lasted for more than three years and proved meritless. There are fundamental laws that prohibit filing multiple lawsuits using the same common-nucleus-of-operative facts by merely switching defendants. As a result of Mr. Cornells actions, I was enthralled in three lawsuits over a four year period. This ridiculous strategy proved a total waste of time, money and in short a financial disaster. Mr. Cornell chose to ignore these basic principles of the law. 1. Common-nucleus-of-operative facts test is a legal doctrine which says that a federal court will have jurisdiction over state law claims. A federal court can exercise its jurisdiction over those state law claims that arise from the same facts as the federal claims. The common nucleus of operative fact test was first adopted in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (U.S. 1966). It is also codified at 28 USCS 1367. 2. Once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision may preclude re-litigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause of action involving a party to the first case. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S. Ct. 411, 414, 66 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1980) (citation omitted). Unlike res judicata, [collateral estoppel] is not limited to parties and their privies. A defendant who was not party to the original action may invoke collateral estoppels against the plaintiff. Hart v. Yamaha-Parts Distributors, Inc., 787 F.2d 1468, 1473 (11th Cir. 1986) (citing Cotton States Mutual Insurance Co. v. Anderson, 749 F.2d 663, 666 (11th Cir. 1984); Charles J. Arndt, Inc., 748 F.2d at 1494. In other words, under federal principles of collateral estoppels, identity of parties is not required when collateral estoppels is used defensively. Amador, 830 So.2d at 122. The defensive use of collateral estoppel precludes a plaintiff from relitigating identical issues by merely switching adversaries. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 329. Thus, defensive collateral estoppel gives a plaintiff a strong incentive to join all potential defendants in the first action if possible. Id at 329-330. I contracted the legal services of the G. Ware Cornell on January 23, 2007, and provided him with a detailed summary of my complaint that included the entire cast of characters involved. He would later convert my summary into the legal brief for my case. From the onset, I requested that Mr. Cornell add all of the responsible parties in the initial lawsuit but he refused. He informed me via email in April 2007, There is a legal reason. You can only sue your employer in this type of litigation. Nearly four years later in December 2010, I would discover from another attorney and a state judge that Mr. Cornell had misled me concerning this and other issues. A sister-company and its company-owned dealerships and employees should have been joined under The Joint Employee Doctrine.

Mr. Cornell should have known these fundamental principles of the law. He has been practicing employment law in Florida for over 36 years.