MARY T. PRANTIL FOLLOWS IN HER CRIMINAL FATHER'S FOOTSTEPS!!!!!!

MATTER OF THE DISBARRMENT OF ATTORNEY FRANK G. PRANTIL

(Mary T. Prantil KEEPS POSTING LIES ABOUT Innocent business and top spell casters  BLOOD LOVE AND LUST SPELLS, JIM MORGAN AND JAN WINDGLOWS OF BLOOD LOVE AND LUST SPELLS...

it is no WONDER that Mary T. Prantil is such a CRIMINAL and SCAM CON...hey public take a look and read below and click the links to verify that Mary T. Prantil and her father are the same birds of a feather- criminals, liars, and drug addicts !!!

After you THE PUBLIC read the information below, you will learn all about Mary T. Prantil's father getting disbarred TWICE as a lawyer, that he caused a MISTRIAL for a famous HIGH PROFILE murder case, that he  charged several times for misconduct,mis representing his clients, all about his cocaine addictions, his lies, schemes, causing a mistrial for a famous controversial murder case, stealing money in the amount of $750,000 from a safe from inside a client's house...


Mary T. Prantil apparently learned everything she knows about being a criminal from her criminal father. PRANTIL GET OFF THE INTERNET AND STOP SHOWING YOUR UGLY LIAR FACE BECAUSE EVERYONE KNOWS ALL ABOUT YOU AND YOUR CRIMINAL FATHER. TAKE A HIKE, YOU ROTTEN LIAR SCUM GUTTER TRASH.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. D-787

110 S. Ct. 493, 493 U.S. 972, 107 L. Ed. 2d 497, 58 U.S.L.W. 3351, 1989.SCT.45677 <http://www.versuslaw.com>

November 27, 1989

IN THE MATTER OF DISBARRMENT OF FRANK G. PRANTIL

For earlier order herein, see Rehnquist, Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy

It having been reported to the Court that Frank G. Prantil, of Fair Oaks, California, has been disbarred from the practice of law by the Supreme Court of California and this Court by order of May 15, 1989, having suspended the said Frank G. Prantil from the practice of law in this Court and directed that a rule issue requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred;

And it appearing that the said rule was duly issued;

It is ordered that the said Frank G. Prantil be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court and that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to practice before the Bar of this Court.

Disposition

Disbarrment entered.

19891127

1998 VersusLaw Inc.

http://wi.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.%5CSCT%5CSCT2%5C1989%5C19891127_0045677.SCT.htm/qx

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On trial before the bar court in San Francisco, FRANK PRANTIL [#35155], 67, of Sacramento is charged with multiple counts of failing to perform legal services competently. Prantil was disbarred in 1989, reinstated in 1994 and charged with misconduct in 2002. The trial on the new charges was ongoing at press time and although the bar had not formally asked for his disbarment, it is a possible penalty.

The 1989 disbarment was the result of convictions for forgery and being an accessory to possess cocaine.

http://www.calbar.ca.gov/state/calbar/calbar_cbj.jsp?sCategoryPath=/Home/Attorney%20Resources/California%20Bar%20Journal/June2005&sCatHtmlPath=cbj/2005-06_TH_03_2nd-disbarments.html&sCatHtmlTitle=Top%20Headlines

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In a case two miles across town at the State Bar offices on Howard Street -- and at the other end of the world of privilege -- 67-year-old defense attorney Frank Prantil is facing a task he's already performed numerous times -- defending himself against accusations that he's acted unethically as an attorney. In 1979, Prantil was suspended from practicing law after he was accused of improperly representing a client. While on probation, Prantil was alleged to have participated in a check-fraud scheme. He was convicted of forgery and disbarred, according to the California Supreme Court opinion confirming Prantil's disbarment.

Prantil later took advantage of California rules that allow disbarred attorneys to ask for reinstatement after five years. Prantil successfully argued that he had rehabilitated himself, and resumed practice in 1994.

Prantil is now facing State Bar disciplinary charges, which could potentially get him disbarred again, alleging that he failed to competently defend a client, then improperly charged the client for his services.

Prantil's case, along with three cases decided earlier this year in which California attorneys were disbarred for a second time, has added steam to a nine-year-old bureaucratic proposal to give judges the option of disbarring the worst attorneys for life.

In California, there now exists no legal concept of permanent disbarment. A State Bar committee on Nov. 15 will consider the possibility of changing that, if only slightly. Rather than making all disbarments permanent, it would extend from five to seven years the amount of time disbarred attorneys would have to wait before requesting to be reinstated, and would give judges the option of forever banishing the worst of California's worst attorneys.

The fact that it's taken nine years for such a mild proposal to reach this preliminary step hints at a lack of seriousness the California legal establishment lobby applies to abuses by its own members.

http://www.sfweekly.com/2005-11-09/news/baring-equality/

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UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Frank G. PRANTIL, Defendant-Appellant.
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

June 25, 1985

764 F.2d 548

Charles F. Gorder, Jr., Asst. U.S. Atty., argued, Peter K. Nunez, U.S. Atty., Charles F. Gorder, Jr., Asst. U.S. Atty., on the brief, San Diego, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.

Eugene G. Iredale, San Diego, Cal., for defendant-appellant.

AMENDED OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court For the Southern District of California.

Before FERGUSON and NELSON, Circuit Judges, and JAMESON, * District Judge.

FERGUSON, Circuit Judge:

1
The defendant, a criminal defense attorney, appeals his conviction on eight out of eleven counts alleged in an indictment for the offenses of perjury, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1623; false statements, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1001; and being accessory after the fact, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3. All of the defendant's convictions are predicated on actions he took while representing a criminal defendant, Betty Powell, in a separate criminal prosecution. After a seven-day trial the jury found the defendant not guilty on two counts of harboring a fugitive and perjury. The district court had previously dismissed the misprision of a felony count before the trial began. On appeal, the defendant raises a host of issues which, for the most part, we need not address. Three of the defendant's challenges, however, require reversal of the defendant's convictions for the reasons explained herein.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

2
The defendant was retained by Ronald Powell to represent his wife, Betty Lou Powell, and her son in a federal criminal prosecution on various drug-related charges.1 Mr. Powell had been a previous client of the defendant in unrelated criminal proceedings. After Mrs. Powell and her son were arrested at the Powell residence on April 23, 1982 in connection with the narcotics charges, Mr. Powell, who was also named in the felony arrest warrant, remained a fugitive until his apprehension on August 10, 1982. On the day of his wife's arrest, Mr. Powell telephoned the defendant, Frank Prantil, and retained his services for the criminal proceedings against his immediate family. Throughout Mr. Powell's fugitive status, the defendant periodically telephoned Mr. Powell and met him on at least two occasions.

3
During their first meeting after the incarceration of Mrs. Powell, Mr. Powell presented the defendant with a partial payment of the retainer agreement and directed the defendant to the whereabouts of other sources of cash in various bank accounts and at the Powell residence. Mrs. Powell, unable to make a $750, 000 bond, remained incarcerated until the completion of her criminal trial. She gave the defendant the power of attorney to collect the funds from the various bank accounts. The defendant also retrieved a substantial sum of money from a floor safe at the Powell residence that had been overlooked at the time of the Powell family arrest. Although questions over the capacity in which Mr. Prantil retained custody of these monies (as attorney fees or in bailment for Mrs. Powell) occupied a substantial portion of the defendant's trial, we need not parse the evidence on this subject here. Pursuant to the retainer agreement negotiated by Mr. Powell, the defendant represented Mrs. Powell for the duration of her criminal trial. The case was prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorney Charles Gorder.

4
Mr. Prantil succeeded in obtaining an acquittal on all but four of the fifteen criminal counts leveled against his client Mrs. Powell. During the course of his representation of Mrs. Powell, the defendant also sent his sister-in-law, Malvina Schmidt, to meet the fugitive Ronald Powell for reasons not relevant here. Within the same time frame, the defendant, on several occasions, acted as the conduit for negotiations between the fugitive Ronald Powell and Assistant U.S. Attorney Gorder for Mr. Powell's surrender. During the period when Mr. Powell was a fugitive, the defendant was summoned before a grand jury and questioned by Mr. Gorder concerning his contacts and relationship with Mr. Powell. Three of the defendant's five perjury convictions rest on responses he made to Mr. Gorder's grand jury examination. The remaining two perjury charges and the two false statement counts stem from the events surrounding the defendant's efforts to obtain Mrs. Powell's release on bond pending the appeal from her criminal conviction. For purposes of this appeal, however, we need only discuss the evidence presented on one perjury count.

5
One of the defendant's perjury convictions rests on grand jury testimony the defendant gave under questioning by Mr. Gorder regarding a trip to Omaha, Nebraska. In his testimony the defendant stated that he was picked up by a blonde woman at his hotel in Omaha, Nebraska who took him to meet Mr. Powell and then transported the defendant to the airport. The defendant further testified that he did not know the identity of this woman. At trial the government contended that the defendant committed perjury when he denied knowing the name of this woman.

6
Under the government's theory, the defendant falsely denied knowing the identity of this blonde woman in order to protect the woman from the grand jury's investigation. The government unsuccessfully sought to prove that the blonde woman who met the defendant at his hotel was Malvina Schmidt, the defendant's sister-in-law. The evidence at trial revealed that although the defendant had been met and transported to a different airport by a blonde woman on a different occasion, no one picked up the defendant at his Omaha hotel. The evidence did demonstrate that the defendant eventually met his sister-in-law at a restaurant in the Omaha area. Accordingly, on appeal the government has shifted its perjury allegation by recasting the defendant's denial of knowledge about the name of the blonde woman who met him at his hotel into a denial of "knowing who was with [Mr.] Powell in the Omaha area." In response, the defendant claims his conviction should be reversed because the identity of the woman whom he incorrectly recalled to have met at his Omaha hotel is immaterial to any matters then before the grand jury and thus not perjurious.

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL

7
The defendant has raised several challenges to his convictions on appeal. We reach only three of his challenges. The defendant's first allegation of error involves the refusal of the trial court to grant a pretrial motion to have the prosecutor, Mr. Gorder, recused from the case so that the defendant could call Mr. Gorder as a witness. The defendant also claims that the prosecutor exceeded the bounds of proper argument during closing argument and the defendant was thereby prejudiced. The final contention of error challenges the materiality of the defendant's allegedly perjurious statements regarding the blonde woman at the Omaha airport.

8
The defendant has also raised a claim of insufficiency of the evidence as to counts seven and eight of the indictment which charged the defendant with violations of the false statement statute, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1001. In essence, the government presented evidence that the defendant attempted to secure the release of his client Betty Powell through the submission of an appeal bond form that the defendant knew was not authorized by the named bond company. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution we find the evidence presented sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Nonetheless, for the reasons discussed in the balance of the opinion, we reverse the defendant's convictions on these and the other counts of the indictment.

A. The Propriety of a Prosecuting Witness

9
The prosecutor in this case, Assistant United States Attorney Charles Gorder, was also the prosecutor in the previous trial of Betty Powell. Mr. Gorder not only opposed the defendant in that trial but also conducted the examination of the defendant in both the grand jury and bond proceedings that are the subject of defendant's perjury convictions in this case. Mr. Gorder was also involved in the discussions with the bond agency as to the adequacy of Mrs. Powell's bond collateral which gave rise to the defendant's false statement convictions. Finally, on several occasions Mr. Gorder negotiated directly with the defendant for the surrender of Ronald Powell, the fugitive whom the defendant was accused of harboring and giving aid. Thus, although he never took the stand, Mr. Gorder was a witness to, and indeed a participant in, some aspect of all of the events alleged in the indictment.

10
The defendant was charged and convicted of being an accessory after the fact to Mr. Powell's criminal offenses in that the defendant did "receive, relieve, comfort and assist Ronald Lee Powell in order to hinder and prevent his apprehension, trial and punishment, " in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3. During trial the principal defense asserted by the defendant to this count, and the harboring a fugitive charge, revolved around the defendant's efforts to successfully negotiate Mr. Powell's surrender with Mr. Gorder. Rather than harboring or assisting Mr. Powell, the defendant contended he was actively conducting the ongoing negotiations for Mr. Powell's timely surrender through direct communications with both Mr. Gorder and Mr. Powell. Obviously, this defense hinges substantially on the availability of evidence detailing the defendant's role in these surrender negotiations.

11
Both before and during the trial defense counsel unsuccessfully moved the court to recuse the prosecutor to enable the defense to call him as a witness. After final argument the defendant moved for a mistrial because the prosecutor's remarks "reaffirm[ed] Mr. Gorder's role as a witness in the case without cross-examination, because they appeared to be, in the way that they were framed, assertions of personal knowledge based on his dealings with Mr. Prantil." At every juncture, the prosecutor refused either to recuse himself or to testify. The trial court declined to disturb the prosecutor's decision and denied, without comment, all of the defendant's motions on this matter.

12
The prosecutor defended his decision, and the trial court concurred, on the grounds that his testimony was unnecessary and cumulative to the defendant's case. We recognize that a defendant has an obligation to exhaust other available sources of evidence before a court should sustain a defendant's efforts to call a participating prosecutor as a witness. United States v. West, 680 F.2d 652, 654 (9th Cir.1982). Nonetheless, the defendant's obligation to resort to alternative means of adducing factual testimony is not absolute. Both the quality and quantity of the alternate sources of evidence are proper subjects for comparison with that sought directly from the participating prosecutor. For example, in this case the prosecutor contends that his testimony on the defendant's efforts to arrange for the surrender of the fugitive Ron Powell was unnecessary and cumulative because the defendant could have presented some testimony on this point through an FBI agent who listened to some, but not all, of the relevant discussions. The prosecutor also avers that the defendant himself was available to testify as to any conversations for which there are no other witnesses besides the defendant and the prosecutor. The true worth of the prosecutor's generous suggestion that the defendant himself testify in order to "exhaust" all other sources of testimony, however, becomes self-evident when the prosecutor subsequently portrays the defendant's testimony as self-serving and "sleazy" in his summation before the jury.

13
Regardless of the prosecutor's view of the utility of his own testimony, the district judge is charged with the responsibility of making determinations as to the materiality of witness testimony. In so doing, the court must honor the defendant's constitutional rights under the confrontation and compulsory process clauses of the Sixth Amendment. The unequivocal admonition of the Supreme Court on this point bears repetition here:

14
The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is both fundamental and comprehensive. The ends of criminal justice would be defeated if judgments were to be founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts. The very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence. To ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to the function of courts that compulsory process be available for the production of evidence needed either by the prosecution or by the defense.

15