Weld County District Attorney Ken Buck Weld County District Court Chief Judge James Hartmann Weld County DA Ken Buck Weld County Chief Judge James Hartmann Greeley, Colorado

Corrupt Weld County District Attorney Ken Buck, and his Corrupt little flunkies, Chief Deputy DA Steve Wrenn, and DDA Sarah Bousman - Destruction of evidence, Subornation of perjury, Obstruction of Justice, falsification of evidence, perjury, forgery, conspiracy to commit deprivation to rights, it's all there. I'm sitting in my house (as differentiated from the term, "home"), under "house arrest" for having "harassed" my former a*****e employers who stole wages due to me, lied to the Weld County District Court, bragged to their General Manager that they were going to "screw" me, and my wife, and take everything we own (2008).  Ken Buck has concealed each and every criminal act Ron Murphy, Scott Murphy, and Ida Murphy, of Dream Stone marble & Granite have committed, for no other reason than concealment of how badly corrupt scumbag Weld County District Court Chief Judge James Hartmann screwed up, as a result of his own PROVABLE BIAS, PREJUDICE, AND OUTRIGHT MALICE my case when I had to drag these (Dream Stone) scumbag assholes into court to attempt to recoup the accrued wages they had stolen from me. Psychopath Ida (Eve) Murphy swore she was going to cause the loss of my home when I quit working for their hell-hole business in 2008, now, maybe as a result as a bribe or payoff. considering Ken Buck's proven pattern of unethical conduct documented from 1991, I'm sitting captive in the very house psychocunt Ida (Eve) Murphy swore to take from me in 2008.

Ironic, Ain't it?

Google it, so much more HARD, FACTUAL evidence to come.  Careers Will End, pursuit of justice WILL NOT.

Craig Buckley
Longmont, Colorado

18-8-105. Accessory to crime
(1)  A person is an accessory to crime if, with intent to hinder, delay, or prevent the discovery, detection, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of another for the commission of a crime, he renders assistance to such person.
(2)  "Render assistance" means to:
(d)  By force, intimidation, or deception, obstruct anyone in the performance of any act which might aid in the discovery, detection, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of such person; or
(e)  Conceal, destroy, or alter any physical or testimonial evidence that might aid in the discovery, detection, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of such person.

The relevant standard for knowledge in regard to the accessory statute is whether defendant knew the principal had committed a crime. People v. Young, 192 Colo. 65, 555 P.2d 1160 (1976).

This section requires only that a defendant obstruct anyone in the performance of any act which might aid in detection of the principal; this section does not require that the act be successful. People v. Preciado-Flores, 66 P.3d 155 (Colo. App. 2002).

The conviction of the principal is not a condition precedent to the conviction of an accessory. Lowe v. People, 135 Colo. 209, 309 P.2d 601 (1957).

38-41-201. Homestead exemption.
Every homestead in the state of Colorado occupied as a home by the owner thereof or his or her family shall be exempt from execution and attachment arising from any debt, contract, or civil obligation not exceeding in value the sum of sixty thousand dollars in actual cash value in excess of any liens or encumbrances on the homesteaded property in existence at the time of any levy of execution thereon.

sufficiently broad and comprehensive to embrace any and all forms of
indebtedness, including judgments. Woodward v. People's Nat'l Bank, 2
Colo. App. 369, 31 P. 184 (1892).

The right to homestead exemption is not given by the bankruptcy law, but
exists, if at all, by virtue of state laws, and the bankruptcy court will allow
whatever exemption the state law allows. Edgington v. Taylor, 270 F. 48
(8th Cir. 1920).

Homestead exempt from judgment lien. This section provides that the homestead shall be exempt from "execution and attachment", and if it is exempt from execution, it must of necessity be exempt from the lien of the judgment, as a judgment lien that cannot be enforced is of no avail.
Weare v. Johnson, 20 Colo. 363, 38 P. 374 (1984); Woodward v.
People's Nat'l Bank, 2 Colo. App. 369, 31 P. 184 (1892); Jones v. Olson,
17 Colo. App. 144, 67 P. 349 (1902); White v. Hartman, 26 Colo. App.
475, 145 P. 716 (1915); Sterling Nat'l Bank v. Francis, 78 Colo. 204, 240
P. 945 (1925); City Center Nat. Bank v. Barone, 807 P.2d 1251 (Colo.
App. 1991).