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Report: #1477689

Complaint Review: Peet's Coffee and Tea - Emeryville California

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  • Reported By: Robert — California United States
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  • Peet's Coffee and Tea 1400 Park Ave Emeryville, California United States

Peet's Coffee and Tea THE PEET'S COFFEE ORGANIZATION DISCRIMINATES & HARASSES MINORITY PATRONS IN VIOLATION OF TITLE II OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 & THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA UNRUH/ BANE CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS (California Civil Code §§ 51 & 52.1). Emeryville California

*Author of original report: Peet's Coffee and Tea, 3121 Crow Canyon Pl Suite C, San Ramon, CA 94583's Defamation, Discrimination and Violations of Law! More Briefing on Defamation for Those Ignorant Thereof:

*Author of original report: Peet's Coffee and Tea, 3121 Crow Canyon Pl Suite C, San Ramon, CA 94583's Invasion of Privacy, Discrimination and Violations of Law! Briefing on Invasion of Privacy for Those Ignorant Thereof:

*Author of original report: Peet's Coffee and Tea, 3121 Crow Canyon Pl Suite C, San Ramon, CA 94583's Defamation, Discrimination and Violations of Law! Briefing on Defamation for Those Ignorant Thereof:

*Author of original report: More onPeet's Coffee and Tea's Discrimination and Violations of Law! A briefing of California’s Anti-Discrimination and Federal Law; the Unruh Civil Rights Act for Those Ignorant Thereof:

*Author of original report: Peet's Coffee and Tea's Discrimination and Violations of Law! Just More Briefing of Federal Law Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; For Those Severely Ignorant Thereof:

*Author of original report: Peet's Coffee and Tea's Discrimination and Violations of Law! More briefing of California’s Anti-Discrimination and Federal Law; the Bane Act. Nifty!

*Author of original report: Peet's Coffee &Tea's Discrimination & Violations of Law! More briefing of California’s Anti-Discrimination & Federal Law, Why Not!; the Unruh Civil Rights Act & Bane Act for Those Ignorant Thereof:

*Author of original report: Peet's Coffee and Tea's Discrimination and Violations of Law! More briefing of California’s Anti-Discrimination and Federal Law; the Unruh Civil Rights Act and Bane Act for Those Ignorant Thereof:

*Author of original report: Not a Ridiculous or Idiotic Case for Peet's Coffee and Tea! Rodriguez v. Cnty. of L. A. 891 F.3d 776 (9th Cir. 2018) A $6,328,174.66 Award Affirmed on Appeal For Plaintiffs!

*Author of original report: Peet's Coffee and Tea's Discrimination and Violations of Law! A briefing of California’s Anti-Discrimination and Federal Law; the Unruh Civil Rights Act and Bane Act for Those Ignorant Thereof:

*Author of original report: Pathetic? Idiotic? Read My Reviews on Peet's Coffee & Tea and It is Easy to Determine Who All the Pathetic Idiots Are Who Didn't Get Their Way!

*Consumer Comment: Ridiculous

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In my opinion, this is an organization filled with hate against minority patrons, in particular, Mexican-Americans. They blatantly violate the civil rights of minority patrons, & further, engage in blatant tort conduct such as harassment, defamation, invasion of privacy, & negligent failure to train & supervise. They even get their customers involved in the hate. Absolutely disgraceful & shameful!

If you complain or exercise your right pursuant to the U.S. Constitution, 1st Amendment, they will retaliate & harass you even using the local police to do so. They have no ethics!

Peet's has been sued for wage and hour violations by employees, false advertising, & disability discrimination.

My investigation confirms this. In my opinion, some of their personnel engaged in criminal conduct. This could constitute hate crimes. Totally outrageous! This is why the Peet's hates me so much.

I encountered the district leader there, not manager, Chrissy Hittman. I was totally unimpressed. She was rude, smirky, offensive, and unpleasant. Now, it is totally clear to me why Peet's Coffee & Tea is experiencing all the legal problems it has, & additionally, the lack of training & rudeness by its personnel. It is clear that Ms. Httman is behind the blunderbuss disaster that Peet's Coffee & Tea has created.

Ms. Hittman communicated to me a document that I found shocking, hideous, hateful, & totally disgraceful. It is readily apparent that she did not seek legal advice before communicating the document to me. It was filled with grotesque falsehoods, & moreover, constituted actionable defamation & evidence of civil rights violations.

What is most interesting is that Ms. Hittman communicated to me the manner in which Peet's Coffee & Tea will be handling this document. The defamation will be republished on a continual basis constituting an additional count of defamation each & every time & a new counting of the statute of limitations perpetually.

Not only did Ms. Hittman incur liability to Peet's Coffee & Tea, she incurred liability to herself and is now a defendant. Curious that this task was handed off to Ms. Hittman & not another manage in the upper echelon of the organization.

Peet's Coffee & Tea's personnel cannot even follow it's own code of ethics, it's basically a falsehood, & all of the circumstances constitute a legal action for negligent failure to train and supervise.

The coffee, atmosphere, & staff are totally unsatisfactory. There is still a ways to go, in my opinion; they set civil rights law back 50 years. I have read the 5 star reviews; no, I have to disagree. If you are going to charge a premium price for your product, then you have to have superb customer service, or, consumers will be satisfied for a comparable product for the same price but better customer service. A better choice may be "Starbucks?" Even McDonald's beats them; really nice people there too!

Peet's needs to put more work into this philosophy. However, the Peet's at 3121 Crow Canyon Place Suite C San Ramon California 94583 has it's own unique set of customer service issues. Peet's is slipping.

I am reluctant to move them up the scale; they seem to be inconsistent with the customer service. Starbucks and McDonald's are giving them a run for the money and are a better choice. 1 Star, but really 0.

CAVEAT EMPTOR!

Would you want to support this organization? More to come.    

This report was posted on Ripoff Report on 04/24/2019 06:39 PM and is a permanent record located here: https://www.ripoffreport.com/report/peets-coffee-tea/emeryville-california-1477689. The posting time indicated is Arizona local time. Arizona does not observe daylight savings so the post time may be Mountain or Pacific depending on the time of year. Ripoff Report has an exclusive license to this report. It may not be copied without the written permission of Ripoff Report. READ: Foreign websites steal our content

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#12 Author of original report

Peet's Coffee and Tea, 3121 Crow Canyon Pl Suite C, San Ramon, CA 94583's Defamation, Discrimination and Violations of Law! More Briefing on Defamation for Those Ignorant Thereof:

AUTHOR: Robert - (United States)

POSTED: Saturday, May 18, 2019

For Peet's Coffee and Tea, Inc. and at 3121 Crow Canyon Pl Suite C, San Ramon, CA 94583:

"Defamation is an invasion of the interest in reputation. The tort involves the intentional publication of a statement of fact that is false, unprivileged, and has a natural tendency to injure or which causes special damage." (Smith vMaldonado(1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 637, 645 (Maldonado).) Defamation has two forms, libel and slander. (Civ. Code, §§ 44, (a)-(b).) Libel involves defamatory publications that are made "by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed representation to the eye." (Civ. Code, § 45.) Slander involves a false and unprivileged publication that is "orally uttered" (Civ. Code, § 46), which means "communication to some third person who understands the defamatory meaning of the statement and its application to the person to whom reference is made." (Maldonadosupra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 645.)

"'"Defamation is 'a false and unprivileged publication that exposes the plaintiff "to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation."'"'" (Dickinson vCosby (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 655, 685 (Dickinson).) "'The elements of a defamation claim are (1) a publication that is (2) false, (3) defamatory, (4) unprivileged, and (5) has a natural tendency to injure or causes special damage.'" (Sanders vWalsh (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 855, 862 (Sanders).) There are two categories of defamation: libel and slander. (Civ. Code, § 44.) "Libel is a false and unprivileged publication by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed representation to the eye, which exposes any  person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation." (§ 45.) "Slander is a false and unprivileged publication, orally uttered," that "[c]harges any person with crime," "[i]mputes in him the present existence of an infectious, contagious, or loathsome disease," or "[t]ends directly to injure him in respect to his . . . business." (§ 46.)

Peet's Coffee and Tea, Inc. and at 3121 Crow Canyon Pl Suite C, San Ramon, CA 94583, along with the sad, poorly trained, and dysfunctional City of San Ramon Police; guilty as charged!

Patrons and consumers should just find another place to drink coffee; liike Starbucks.  Beware of the organization.  More to come.  

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#11 Author of original report

Peet's Coffee and Tea, 3121 Crow Canyon Pl Suite C, San Ramon, CA 94583's Invasion of Privacy, Discrimination and Violations of Law! Briefing on Invasion of Privacy for Those Ignorant Thereof:

AUTHOR: Robert - (United States)

POSTED: Friday, May 17, 2019

Peet's Coffee and Tea, 3121 Crow Canyon Pl Suite C, San Ramon, CA 94583, what a  bunch of blundering fools, stupid cops and all: 

The right of privacy is recognized in California, and an invasion of the right by appropriation of name, likeness, or personality is an actionable tort.  Lugosi v. Universal Pictures (1979) 25 Cal.3d 813, 819.

As explained in Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 200, 227 (Shulman), in addition to a tort cause of action for invasion of privacy, which can be pled on a number of different factual bases, there is also a separate constitutionally based cause of action for invasion of privacy. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1; Shulman, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 214, fn. 4, 227.) The Supreme Court stated that the two sources of protection for privacy, common law and the state Constitution, are not unrelated.

Specifically, the Supreme Court explained that none of its prior decisions suggested that "the conceptual framework developed for resolving privacy claims under the California Constitution was intended to supplant the common law tort analysis or preclude its independent development." (Ibid.)

Constitutional Right to Privacy.

The California Constitution, as amended by the voters in 1972, protects the right of privacy of California citizens. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1.) This "inalienable" right encompasses privacy protections broader than those recognized by the federal constitution. (American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren (1997) 16 Cal.4th 307, 327-328.) The amendment gives rise to a cause of action for invasion of privacy against either the state or private individuals. (See White v. Davis (1975) 13 Cal.3d 757, 775; Chico Feminist Women's Health Center v. Scully (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 230, 242.) The elements of the claim are "(1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances; and (3) conduct by defendant constituting a serious invasion of privacy." (Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 39-40.) Privacy interests are recognized in maintaining a reputation as a law abiding person, where there is no sufficient justification for publicizing old criminal information about a person. (Shulman, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 219-222.)

Common Law Right to Privacy

a. Disclosing Personal Information Tort. 

The plaintiff who seeks to recover damages from a defendant who has disclosed to the public personal information about the plaintiff ordinarily must plead and prove:

1. The matter disclosed was purely private, i.e., not available to the public, either generally or by way of public record. Cox Broad. Corp. v Cohn (1975) 420 US 469, 43 L Ed 2d 328, 95 S Ct 1029; Forsher v Bugliosi (1980) 26 Cal.3d 792, 808, 163 Cal.Rptr. 628; Gill v Hearst Publ'g Co. (1953) 40 Cal.2d 224, 253 P2d 441.

2. The disclosure was "to the public in general or to a large number of persons as distinguished from one individual or a few." Porten v University of San Francisco (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 825, 828, 134 Cal.Rptr. 839; see Virgil v Time, Inc. (9th Cir 1975) 527 F2d 1122, 1126.

3. The matter disclosed was "offensive and objectionable to a reasonable [person] of ordinary sensibilities." Forsher v Bugliosi, supra, 26 Cal.3d 809, 163 Cal.Rptr. 628.

4. The disclosure was not of a matter of legitimate public concern (i.e., it was not newsworthy). Diaz v Oakland Tribune, Inc. (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 118, 188 Cal.Rptr. 762; see Virgil v Time, Inc. (9th Cir 1975) 527 F2d 1122, 1129 (the requirement is met when the disclosure complained of constituted "morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake, with which a reasonable member of the public, with decent standards, would say that he had no concern").

This "public disclosure" tort is described in Restatement (Second) of Torts §652D (1977) as follows: "One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public."

The First Amendment does not, however, permit the imposition of invasion of privacy liability on a media defendant's publication of facts obtained from public official records of a criminal proceeding, even one concerning a felony conviction many years earlier. Gates v Discovery Communication, Inc. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 679, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 663 (television documentary about person who, since serving prison term, had lived obscure, lawful life and become respected member of community).

The Gatescourt overruled its own prior decision that an actionable privacy violation could occur through the reckless, offensive, injurious publication of true but not newsworthy information about the criminal past of a rehabilitated convict. See Justice Kennard's concurring opinion in Shulman v Group W Prods.,supra, 18 Cal.4th 246, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, citing Cox Broad. Corp. v Cohn (1975) 420 US 469, 496, 43 L Ed 2d 328, 350, 95 S Ct 1029, 1047, which said that "the First and Fourteenth Amendments will not allow exposing the press to liability for truthfully publishing information released to the public in official records."

In Gates, the court expressly overruled Briscoe v Reader's Digest a*s'n (1971) 4 Cal.3d 529, 93 Cal.Rptr. 866 (the identification of a plaintiff in an article about long-past crimes). Of questionable precedentiary validity is Melvin v Reid (1931) 112 Cal.App. 285, 297 P 91 (the use of a plaintiff's name, after she had reformed, in connection with unsavory incidents in her earlier life). See also Conklin v Sloss (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 241, 150 Cal.Rptr. 121 (a crime committed 20 years earlier); Michaels v Internet Entertainment Group, Inc. (CD Cal 1998) 5 F Supp 2d 823, 839 (the newsworthiness privilege did not prevent celebrity couple from advancing the right to privacy claim to bar distribution on Internet of videotape depicting them engaged in sex).

Lack of newsworthiness is an essential element of a cause of action based on a publication's giving unwanted publicity to allegedly private aspects of a person's life. Shulman v Group W Prods., supra, 18 Cal.4th 200, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 843 (summary judgment for the defendant was proper because a television broadcast regarding an automobile accident in which plaintiffs (mother and son) were injured had subject matter of legitimate public concern). Thus, even if the material published is offensive, it is not actionable if it is newsworthy. Kapellas v Kofman (1969) 1 Cal.3d 20, 35, 81 Cal.Rptr. 360 (the children of candidate for public office could not recover for disclosure of their conduct, recorded on police blotter); Sipple v Chronicle Publ'g Co. (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 1040, 1046, 201 Cal.Rptr.  665. See also Taus v Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 715, 54 Cal.Rptr.3d 775 (there was no liability for stating actual initials of "Jane Doe" during a deposition given weeks after she had revealed her full name in her complaint in a separate suit); Beruan v French (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 825, 128 Cal.Rptr. 869 (a candidate for public office has no right of privacy as to truthful information that may be relevant to his or her qualifications for office); Carlisle v Fawcett Publications, Inc. (1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 733, 20 Cal.Rptr. 405 (there was no cause of action in favor of person closely related to public figure).

In determining whether the private facts are covered by the privilege for reporting private but newsworthy information, the court must balance (1) the social value of the facts published, (2) the depth of the intrusion into ostensibly private affairs, and (3) the extent to which a party voluntarily acceded to a position of public notoriety. Michaels v Internet Entertainment Group, Inc., supra, 5 F Supp 2d 841.

The publishing of a photograph taken in a public place does not ordinarily invade the privacy of the persons depicted (see Gill v Hearst Publ'g Co., supra, 40 Cal.2d 224, 253 P2d 441), but juxtaposing the photograph with text that reveals, or suggests, embarrassing information about the persons may invade their privacy. See M.G. v Time Warner, Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 623, 631, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 504 (a photo showing a little league team accompanied by text about sexual molestation of minors). See also Gill v Curtis Publ'g Co., supra, 38 Cal.2d 275, 239 P2d 630 (a photo of pair spooning at an ice cream parlor accompanied by text relating depicted conduct to "wrong kind" of love).

b. False Light Tort.

Comment (a) to Restatement Second of Torts, section 652D states that “publicity” “means that the matter is made public, by communicating it to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge.” This point has been placed in brackets because it may not be an issue in every case.

As reflected in the citations below, false light claims are subject to the same constitutional protections that apply to defamation claims. Thus, a knowing violation or reckless disregard for the plaintiff’s rights is required where the plaintiff is a public figure or the subject matter of the communication is a matter of public concern. If a false light claim is combined with a defamation or libel claim, the standard applied in the instructions should be equivalent.

If a plaintiff has combined a false light claim with a claim of defamation or libel, the court should consider whether separate instructions on each claim should be given in light of Eisenberg v. Alameda Newspapers (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1385, fn. 13 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 802] and Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Assn. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 529, 543 [93 Cal.Rptr. 866, 483 P.2d 34].

Restatement Second of Torts, section 652E provides:

One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if (a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in  which the other would be placed.

“California common law has generally followed Prosser’s classification of privacy interests as embodied in the Restatement.” (Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 24 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 865 P.2d 633], internal citation omitted.)

“In order to be actionable, the false light in which the plaintiff is placed must be highly offensive to a reasonable person. Although it is not necessary that the plaintiff be defamed, publicity placing one in a highly offensive false light will in most cases be defamatory as well.” (Fellows v. National Enquirer (1986) 42 Cal.3d 234, 238–239 [228 Cal.Rptr. 215, 721 P.2d 97], internal citation omitted; Emphasis added.)

“When a false light claim is coupled with a defamation claim, the false light claim is essentially superfluous, and stands or falls on whether it meets the same requirements as the defamation cause of action.” (Eisenberg, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 1385, fn. 13, internal citations omitted.)

“[A] ‘false light’ cause of action ‘is in substance equivalent to . . . [a] libel claim, and should meet the same requirements of the libel claim . . . including proof of malice.’ ” (Briscoe, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 543, internal citation omitted.)

“The New York Times decision defined a zone of constitutional protection within which one could publish concerning a public figure without fear of liability. That constitutional protection does not depend on the label given the stated cause of action; it bars not only actions for defamation, but also claims for
invasion of privacy.” (Reader’s Digest Assn., Inc. v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 244, 265 [208 Cal.Rptr. 137, 690 P.2d 610], internal citations omitted.)

In Time, Inc. v. Hill (1967) 385 U.S. 374 [87 S.Ct. 534, 17 L.Ed.2d 456], the Court held that the New York Times v. Sullivan malice standard applied to a privacy action that was based on a “false light” statute where the matter involved a public figure. Given the similarities between defamation and false light actions, it appears likely that the negligence standard for private figure defamation plaintiffs announced in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974) 418 U.S. 323 [94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789] should apply to private figure false light plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs must comply with the retraction statute (Civ. Code, § 48a) to recover more than special damages in a false light cause of action. (Briscoe, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 543.)

“We hold that whenever a claim for false light invasion of privacy is based on language that is defamatory within the meaning of section 45a, pleading and proof of special damages are required.” (Fellows, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 251.)

Statutory Invasion of Privacy - California Civil Code § 3344.

California Civil Code § 3344 provides in pertinent part:

3344. Use of Another's Name, Voice, Signature, Photograph, or Likeness in Advertising or Soliciting Without Prior Consent.

(a) Any person who knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of products, merchandise, goods or services, without such person's prior consent, or, in the case of a minor, the prior consent of his parent or legal guardian, shall be liable for any damages sustained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof. In addition, in any action brought under this section, the person who violated the section shall be liable to the injured party or parties in an amount equal to the greater of seven hundred fifty dollars ($750) or the actual damages suffered by him or her as a result of the unauthorized use, and any profits from the unauthorized use that are attributable to the use and are not taken into account in computing the actual damages. In establishing such profits, the injured party or parties are required to prove his or her deductible expenses. Punitive damages may also be awarded to the injured party or parties. The prevailing party in any action under this section shall also be entitled to attorney's fees and costs.

See Eastwood v. Superior Court, (1983) 149 Cal.App. 409, 198 Cal.Rptr. 342:

This California appellate decision allowed actor Clint Eastwood to state a right of publicity cause of action under California common law and Civil Code Section 3344 against The National Enquirer magazine. Eastwood, 198 Cal.Rptr. at 344-345.

"A common law cause of action for appropriation of name or likeness may be pleaded by alleging (1) the defendant's use of the plaintiff's identity; (2) the appropriation of plaintiff's name or likeness to defendant's advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) the lack of consent; and (4) resulting injury." Id. at. 347.

 In Taus v. Loftus, supra, 40 Cal.4th 683, the plaintiff filed an action against defendants, challenging defendants' activities in investigating, publishing, and thereafter publicly discussing their articles and investigation.  The complaint asserted that defendants improperly had invaded plaintiff's privacy and committed other tortious conduct by investigating plaintiff's background and discovering and disclosing information concerning her private life without her consent.

Defendants responded by filing special motions to strike the complaint pursuant to California's anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16), asserting that the complaint sought to impose liability upon them for actions that were undertaken in furtherance of their constitutional right of free speech. The trial court denied the motions in large part, concluding that the bulk of plaintiff's claims should be permitted to go forward. On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that most of the claims set forth in the complaint should be dismissed under the anti-SLAPP statute, but also concluded that the suit could proceed with regard to four aspects of defendants' conduct that were challenged in the complaint.   Defendants sought review in the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court.where the plaintiff alleged that "defendants employed fraudulent means to obtain private information from plaintiff's relatives, including misrepresenting their identity and befriending plaintiff's biological mother." Taus, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 701.

The Taus court then struck all allegations except those relating to obtaining private information by fraudulent means. Id. at p. 742.

Dispacable Tortfeasors!  Filled with Hate and Animus, in particular, Mexican American Men!

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#10 Author of original report

Peet's Coffee and Tea, 3121 Crow Canyon Pl Suite C, San Ramon, CA 94583's Defamation, Discrimination and Violations of Law! Briefing on Defamation for Those Ignorant Thereof:

AUTHOR: Robert - (United States)

POSTED: Wednesday, May 15, 2019

Peet's Coffee and Tea, 3121 Crow Canyon Pl Suite C, San Ramon, CA 94583; world class slanderers and libelers.  Here is a brief on how they recklessly violate law and commit tort against Citizen's causing damages: 

The elements of a defamation claim are (1) a publication that is (2) false, (3) defamatory, (4) unprivileged, and (5) has a natural tendency to injure or causes special damage. (Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 720 [54 Cal. Rptr. 3d 775, 151 P.3d 1185].) Civil Code section 45 provides, “Libel is a false and unprivileged publication by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed representation to the eye, which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation.”

“Statements that contain such a charge directly, and without the need for explanatory matter, are libelous per se. [Citation.] A statement can also be libelous per se if it contains a charge by implication from the language employed by the speaker and a listener could understand the defamatory meaning without the necessity of knowing extrinsic explanatory matter. [Citation.]” (McGarry v. University of San Diego (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 97, 112 [64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 467], italics added (McGarry); see Civ. Code, § 45a which provides, in relevant part, “A libel which is defamatory of the plaintiff without the necessity of explanatory matter, such as an inducement, innuendo or other extrinsic fact, is said to be a libel on its face. Defamatory language not libelous on its face is not actionable unless the plaintiff alleges and proves that he has suffered special damage as a proximate result thereof.”

‘The sine qua non of recovery for defamation … is the existence of falsehood.’ [Citation.] Because the statement must contain a provable falsehood, courts distinguish between statements of fact and statements of opinion for purposes of defamation liability. Although statements of fact may be actionable as libel, statements of opinion are constitutionally protected. [Citation.]” (McGarry, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 112.) That does not mean that statements of opinion enjoy blanket protection. (Ibid.) On the contrary, where an expression of opinion implies a false assertion of fact, the opinion can constitute actionable defamation. (Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. (1990) 497 U.S. 1, 18-19 [111 L. Ed. 2d 1, 110 S. Ct. 2695].) The critical question is not whether a statement is fact or opinion, but ” ‘whether a reasonable fact finder could conclude the published statement declares or implies a provably false assertion of fact.’ ” (McGarry, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 113.) Sine qua non dictionary definition "an essential condition; a thing that is absolutely necessary." 

“To determine whether a statement is actionable fact or nonactionable opinion, courts use a totality of the circumstances test of whether the statement in question communicates or implies a provably false statement of fact. [Citation.] Under the totality of the circumstances test, ‘[f]irst, the language of the statement is examined. For words to be defamatory, they must be understood in a defamatory sense. … [¶] Next, the context in which the statement was made must be considered.’ [Citation.]” (McGarry, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 113.)

Republishing defamation is actionable.  See McKinney v. County of Santa Clara (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 787, 795, 797. These creepy individuals at Peet's Coffee and Tea, Inc. are the most detestable in the world.  Dumb management, dumb police who conspire with these tortfeasors, should be cast into a Court of law and made examples of; high 6 figures.

See Hassel v Bird, (2018) Cal. Supreme Court, S235968; default judgment for $557,918.85 for libeling an attorney on the internet.  

Caveat Emptor.  If this is how Peet's Coffee and Tea, and in particular at 3121 Crow Canyon Pl Suite C, San Ramon, CA 94583 behave; go to another coffee shop for better service and a better experience.  Their representations as a good and ethical organization are false.

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#9 Author of original report

More onPeet's Coffee and Tea's Discrimination and Violations of Law! A briefing of California’s Anti-Discrimination and Federal Law; the Unruh Civil Rights Act for Those Ignorant Thereof:

AUTHOR: Robert - (United States)

POSTED: Tuesday, May 14, 2019

Here is more briefing for "Stacey," a friend of Peet's Coffee and Tea, and the poorly trained, miserable, dysfunctional, and malfeasants at Peet's Coffee and Tea, 3121 Crow Canyon Pl Suite C, San Ramon, CA 94583:

Although on its face, Civil Code section 51 prohibited discrimination only on the bases of "sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability or medical condition" (Civ. Code § 51), it had been extended by case law to discrimination based on various other classifications, including sexual orientation.  (Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts (1998) 17 Cal.4th 670, 703; Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142, 1154-1162; Hessians Motorcycle Club v. J.C. Flanagans (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 833, 836.)  In Beaty v. Truck Ins. Exchange (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1455, 1462, the Court of Appeal declined to expand the Unruh Act to include marital status as an additional category of prohibited discrimination.  Later opinions approved Beaty's construction of the Unruh Act.  (See Brown v. Smith (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 767, 787; Hessians Motorcycle Club v. J.C. Flanagans, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 836; King v. Hofer (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 678, 682-683.)

You cannot arbitrarily ban a Mexican-American from you business establishment by intimidating and harrassing him with the City of San Ramon Police, libeling him, fabricating evidence in a false attempt to have him arrested, and retaliating against him for exercising his U.S. Constitution, 1st Amendment.  Who does this kind of stuff?  This evidences animous, hatred, and racial discrimination.  

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#8 Author of original report

Peet's Coffee and Tea's Discrimination and Violations of Law! Just More Briefing of Federal Law Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; For Those Severely Ignorant Thereof:

AUTHOR: Robert - (United States)

POSTED: Saturday, May 04, 2019

42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims.

This is quite interesting as it applies to the egregious harassment and intimidation by the poorly trained San Ramon Police Department at the bequest of Peet's Coffee and Tea, Inc., 3121 Crow Canyon Place Suite C, San Ramon, California 94583:

Where a plaintiff "allege[s] discrete acts of police surveillance and intimidation directed solely at silencing" her or him, a civil rights claim will lie. The defendant's intent is an element of the claim. See Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1054, 107 S.Ct. 928, 93 L.Ed.2d 979 (1987).  

" 'To make out a cause of action under section 1983, plaintiff must plead that (1) the defendants acting under color of state law (2) deprived plaintiffs of rights secured by the Constitution or federal statutes.' " Soranno's Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1313-14 (9th Cir.1989) (quoting Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1054, 107 S.Ct. 928, 93 L.Ed.2d 979 (1987)).

The harassing San Ramon Police Department in conjunction with Peet's Coffee and Tea, Inc. harassed a Mexican-American at their business establishment for six months, surveilling and intimidating him which was directed solely at silencing his First Amendment Right to post reviews on the internet regarding Peet's Coffee and Tea, Inc.; eventually banning him from their establisment without a ligitimate business reason. A prima facie case of  violation of the First Amendment Right of free speech, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  

In addition to Plaintiff's § 1983 claims, he not only maintains causes of action for direct constitutional violations under the First Amendment, but also under the  Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff can raise claims that the defendant City of San Ramon officials and Peet's Coffee and Tea, Inc. made false accusations and otherwise unlawfully conspired against him, with the intent that criminal proceedings be wrongfully initiated (1) in order to discourage his protected First Amendment conduct as a citizen, and (2) on account of his Mexican-American ethnicity in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection.

See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).  

Here, the false accusations and other wrongful actions were intended to lead to the institution of criminal proceedings and were intentionally discriminatory. It sadly failed; but a legal action may still ensue.  According to Plaintiff, the defendants wanted to "get" him because he was an Mexican-American, and he complained of their misconduct and posted it in the internet. Plaintiff's claim is that the defendants wanted to wrongly initiate a prosecution but for the false reports that Peet's Coffee and Tea, Inc. lodged because of their racial animus.

There is no other such conduct aimed at anybody else except a Mexican-American male who complained on the internet about poor service and other misconduct.

Interestingly, Plaintiff spoke to one the sergeant's at the City of San Ramon Police Department; Sergeant Fajardo.  In attempting to make an excuse for the sad City of San Ramon Police Department's egregious harassing and intimidating constitutional violations of Plaintiff's rights; Fajardo stated that their officers are highly trained in detecting and evaluating mental illness...right.  In six months they still couldn't get it right.  

So, I will not refer to them as police officers anymore; I will call them "doctors."  They should start wearing sphygmomanometers around their necks and head mirrors on duty.  

"Dr. Fajardo, Dr. Fajardo, 5150 patient in the waiting room. Bring your stun gun and straight jacket."  Ridiculous.  What a laugh. 

Shame, shame, shame on Peet's Coffee and Tea, Inc., and in particular, at 3121 Crow Canyon Place Suite C, San Ramon, California 94583.  Unsupervised, untrained, misled, dumb, and just filled with plain hate.  

More to come.

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#7 Author of original report

Peet's Coffee and Tea's Discrimination and Violations of Law! More briefing of California’s Anti-Discrimination and Federal Law; the Bane Act. Nifty!

AUTHOR: Robert - (United States)

POSTED: Friday, May 03, 2019

The Bane Act

Civil Code section 52.1, commonly referred to as the "Tom Bane Civil Rights Act" or the "Bane Act," "was originally enacted [in 1987] 'to stem a tide of hate crimes.'" (Venegas v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 32 Cal.4th 820, 845 (conc. opn. of Baxter, J.).) The statute, however, does not require a showing that the violator acted with discriminatory intent or animus. (Id. at p. 850.) It provides:

"(a) If a person or persons, whether or not acting under color of law, interferes by threats, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threats, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state, the Attorney General, or any district attorney or city attorney may bring a civil action for injunctive and other appropriate equitable relief in the name of the people of the State of California, in order to protect the peaceable exercise or enjoyment of the rights or rights secured. An action brought by the Attorney General, any district attorney, or any city attorney may also seek a civil penalty of twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000). If this civil penalty is requested, it shall be assessed individually against each person who is determined to have violated this section and the penalty shall be awarded to each individual whose rights under this section are determined to have been violated.
"(b) Any individual whose exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state, has been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with, as described in subdivision (a), may institute and prosecute in his or her own name and on his or her own behalf a civil action for damages, including, but not limited to, damages under section 52, injunctive relief, and other appropriate equitable relief to protect the peaceable exercise or enjoyment of the right or rights secured." (Civ. Code., section 52.1, italics added.)

In addition, subdivision (g) of Civil Code section 52.1 provides, "An action brought pursuant to this section is independent of any other action, remedy, or procedure that may be available to an aggrieved individual under any other provision of law, including, but not limited to, an action, remedy, or procedure brought pursuant to Section 51.7."

Thus, ‘[California's] “hate crimes” law[s] clearly establish [ ] that crimes motivated by bigotry and bias are against the public policy of the state.’ (Webb v. Puget Sound Broadcasting Co. (1998) 1998 Wn.App. Lexis 1795, p. *9 [138 Lab.Cas. P 58612, p. 89,647, 1998 WL 898788, p. *3].

‘[t]here is no question that the statutory rights established by the [Ralph Civil Rights Act and the Tom Bane  Civil Rights Act] are “for a public reason.” ’ (Armendariz [ v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) ] 24 Cal.4th [83,] 100 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745, 6 P.3d 669].) Thus, the hate crimes laws constitute unwaivable statutory rights.” (D.C. v. Harvard–Westlake School, (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 836, 856-859, fn. omitted.)

Nifty! For Stacey and Peet's Coffee and Tea, 3121 Crow Canyon Place Suite C, San Ramon, CA 94583.

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#6 Author of original report

Peet's Coffee &Tea's Discrimination & Violations of Law! More briefing of California’s Anti-Discrimination & Federal Law, Why Not!; the Unruh Civil Rights Act & Bane Act for Those Ignorant Thereof:

AUTHOR: Robert - (United States)

POSTED: Friday, May 03, 2019

I am starting to enjoy this.

More good reading for the Peet's Coffee and Tea Oganization and their lost supporters and cohorts.

They should enjoy Hessians Motorcycle Club v. J. C. Flanagans (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 833.

This was the Court's discussion in Hessians which I find absolutely beautiful:

The Unruh Act prohibits businesses from denying any person access to public accommodations based on specified classifications. ( Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991)52 Cal.3d 1142, 1148. ( Harris).) Section 51, subdivision (b), provides in part: "All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, or medical condition are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever."

In addition to the particular forms of discrimination specifically outlawed by the Act (sex, race, color, etc.), courts have held the Act "prohibit[s] discrimination based on several classifications which are not specifically enumerated in the statute." (Gayer v. Polk Gulch, Inc. (1991) 231 Cal.App,3d 515, 520.) These judicially-recognized classifications include unconventional dress or physical appearance ( In re Cox (1970) 3 Cal.3d 205, 217-218), families with children ( Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson (1982) 30 Cal.3d 721, 736-741), homosexuality (Rolon v. Kulwitzky (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 289, 292), and persons under 18 (O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Assn.(1983) 33 Cal.3d 790, 794).

In Harrissupra, 52 Cal.3d 1142, the Supreme Court reexamined these earlier decisions which treated the list of statutory classifications as "`illustrative rather than restrictive'" ( id. at p. 1152) and cautioned against extending the Act's reach any further. "[W]ere we writing on a clean slate, the repeated emphasis in the language of sections 51 and 52 on the specified classifications of race, sex, religion, etc., would represent a highly persuasive, if not dispositive, factor in our construction of the Act. [Citation.]" ( Id. at p. 1159.) The court concluded "the Legislature intended to confine the scope of the Act to the . . . types of discrimination" specifically identified in the statute. ( Id. at p. 1155.)

Despite this conclusion, the Harris court did not overrule the prior cases which extended the Act to certain nonenumerated classifications. ( Harrissupra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1155.) The court did, however, adopt a new, narrower construction of the Act and "made it clear future expansion of prohibited categories should be carefully weighed to ensure a result consistent with legislative intent. [Citations.]" ( Beaty v. Truck Ins. Exchange (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1455, 1462, italics added.) To that end, the court engaged in a three-step inquiry in considering (and rejecting) application of the Act to "economic" discrimination — the "new" classification at issue in that case. ( Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 1159-1169 [analyzing (1) the language of the statute, (2) the legitimate business interests of the defendants, and (3) the consequences of allowing the new discrimination claim].) In the wake of Harris, courts have consistently followed this three-part analysis when determining whether a "new" classification is a form of discrimination prohibited by the Act. (See, e.g., King v. Hofer (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 678-682; Beaty v. Truck Ins. Exchangesupra, 6 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1162-1465; Gayer v. Polk Gulch, Inc.supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 521.)

The Hessians attempt to stake out an Unruh Act claim here by characterizing their exclusion from the bar as discrimination based on unconventional appearance — a nonenumerated classification recognized in In re Coxsupra, 3 Cal.3d 205, 217-218, and reaffirmed in Harrissupra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1155. In Cox, a shopping mall attempted to eject a young man based solely on the appearance of his companion "who wore long hair and dressed in an unconventional manner." ( In re Coxsupra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 210.) The court held the Unruh Act barred such treatment; in fact, the court held the Act "prohibit[ed] all arbitrary discrimination by business establishments." ( Id. at p. 216, italics added.) Harris subsequently limited that holding to the much narrower rule that the Act precludes discrimination based on unconventional appearance. ( Harrissupra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 1155-1161.)

Lovely.  The Hessians lost here, but, the explanation of the Act is most illustrative.

Here, the dumbfounded Peet's Coffee and Tea Organization, it's sadly untrained and unsupervised employees, their religious cult like following customers, and let us not foget the stupid white police; banned a Mexican-Amercan man from their business establishment, a prima facie case for discrimination regardless of the Courts' expansions on the Act.

Not only that, they libeled him, retaliated against him for excercising his US Constitution and California Constitution rights of freedom of speech (posting negative reviews on the internet), committed common law tort with other violations of state and federal law; and the expansion of the Unruh Act demonstrates that this type of conduct will not be tolerated in our State at a minimum.

What are the legitimate business interests of the defendants Peet's Coffee and Tea and others? They have none; the reasons they rely on are all provably false assertions of materal fact; they fabricated them constituting despicable conduct.  They called the police on the banned patron for 6 months, 6 months making false police reports attempting to have him arrested as a reason to ban him while intimidating and harassing him; causing more damages in their wrongful and puzzling plight.  

Who does this stuff?  Haters, people filled with animous for being exposed of the wrongful conduct revealing malice and vexation!  Most of them were close to minimum wage earners; the "District Leader" defendant Chrissy Hittman (White) in my estimation did not make much more.  In weighing this; was it worth it?  If any of these individuals are terminated for their conduct related to this and litigation, it will follow them for a lifetime.  

If they applied for other positions with a different company (Starbucks) Peet's Coffee and Tea would more than likely have a duty to tell perspective employers all that transpired for fear of being sued themselves for negligent referring.  Peet's Coffee and Tea would exercise their privilege in any defamation action. Peet's Coffee and Tea could care less about their former employers; what a despicable and crummy organization.

Speaking of Starbucks; does that organization do anything like this?  No, they probably requested legal advise after their national melee last year involving the false arrest of two African-American men in Philadelphia.  (Link below)  Peet's Coffee and Tea; penny wise and dollar foolish.

In thinking of these events, I am beside myself.  Really?  Hate, discrimination, shameful conduct, tort, colluding, stupid white police, hateful customers, rationalization, vexation, malice, oppression, dumb in the 21st century.  Then, we have a rebuttal from Stacey who cannot see the forest for the trees. White.  

That's why we have courts, and a long history of litigation involving discrimination.  They should only hope that the Judge is not a minority; like federal court Judge Troy L. Nunley.  Judgment day is coming.

CAVEAT EMPTOR

Robert

Look at these pictures.  White police arresting two innocent African-American men for sitting at Starbuck's! Horrible!  What was Peet's Coffee and Tea thinking?  Hate.  

https://www.philly.com/philly/news/starbucks-philadelphia-arrests-black-men-video-viral-protests-background-20180416.html

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#5 Author of original report

Peet's Coffee and Tea's Discrimination and Violations of Law! More briefing of California’s Anti-Discrimination and Federal Law; the Unruh Civil Rights Act and Bane Act for Those Ignorant Thereof:

AUTHOR: Robert - (United States)

POSTED: Wednesday, May 01, 2019

This should be of great interest to the Peet's Coffee and Tea organazation, and their friends, including Stacey, since it was noted that my post and complaints are "pathetic" and "ridiculous," an attempt to slam.  

Gatto v. County of Sonoma, 98 Cal. App. 4th 744 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) should get their interest.  

This is what the Court stated there: 

Citing the Supreme Court's opinion in Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721 (Cal. 1982):

Marina Point presented the question whether an owner of an apartment complex may lawfully refuse to rent any of its apartments to a family solely because the family includes a minor child. In the landlord's action to eject the family, the municipal court found that "`[c]hildren are rowdier, noisier, and more mischievous and more boisterous than adults,'" and upheld the landlord's policy of excluding all families with minor children. (30 Cal. 3d at p. 724.) Focusing exclusively on the equal access to business establishment provisions of the Unruh Act (§ 51, subd. (b)), the Supreme Court reversed.

The high court held, among other things, that the antidiscrimination provisions of section 51 are not confined only to a limited category of protected classes, but protect all persons from any arbitrary discrimination by a business establishment. In the course of explaining this holding, the Court stated that "the basic rights guaranteed by section 51 would be drastically undermined if, as the landlord contends, a business enterprise could exclude from its premises or services entire classes of the public simply because the owner of the enterprise had some reason to believe that the class, taken as a whole, might present greater problems than other groups. Under such an approach, for example, members of entire occupations or avocations, e.g., sailors or motorcyclists, might find themselves excluded as a class from some places of public accommodation simply because the proprietors could show that, as a statistical matter, members of their occupation or avocation were more likely than others to be involved in a disturbance." ( Id. at p. 739, italics added.) (98 Cal. App. 4th at p. 766 [Emphasis added].)

Although Gatto lost here on the Unruh Act (§ 51, subd. (b)) cause of action (Denial of access to a fair for wearing a Hell's Angel vest); here, Peet's Coffee and Tea cannot arbitrarily discriminate and ban patrons from their establishment simply because they "had some reason to believe that the class, taken as a whole, might present greater problems than other groups." Ibid.The California Court's have expanded the reach of the Unruh Act (§ 51, subd. (b)), although, not entirely.  Arbitrary discrimination, whether or not in a protected class, is illegal and actionable!

What is important to note about the Peet's Coffee and Tea orginzation is they used the City of San Ramon Police (dumb police) to harass and intimidate a patron in hopes that is would lead to a false arrest, and that would lead to the banning of the patron.  For months! They manuafctured evidence here!  It failed, however, created other problems for Peet's Coffee and Tea such as violations of other State and Federal statute; along with violations of the California and U.S. Constitutions.  

A serious blunder.  Pathetic?  Idiotic? A slam? Not by the banned patron!  Its the other way around.  What kind of people are these?  I think I stated it in another post.  

 More to come.  

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#4 Author of original report

Not a Ridiculous or Idiotic Case for Peet's Coffee and Tea! Rodriguez v. Cnty. of L. A. 891 F.3d 776 (9th Cir. 2018) A $6,328,174.66 Award Affirmed on Appeal For Plaintiffs!

AUTHOR: Robert - (United States)

POSTED: Tuesday, April 30, 2019

A good read!  It's real!

https://www.leagle.com/decision/infco20180530184

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#3 Author of original report

Peet's Coffee and Tea's Discrimination and Violations of Law! A briefing of California’s Anti-Discrimination and Federal Law; the Unruh Civil Rights Act and Bane Act for Those Ignorant Thereof:

AUTHOR: Robert - (United States)

POSTED: Monday, April 29, 2019

"If a person or persons, whether or not acting under color of law, interferes by threats, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threats, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state …" Civ. Code § 52.1, subd. (a); [emphasis added]  

A plaintiff may focus on Civil Code § 43 which states that, “…every person has, subject to the qualifications and restrictions provided by law, the right of protection from bodily restraint or harm, from personal insult, from defamation, and from injury to his personal relations.” [emphasis added]  

Under the State of California Bane Act; the "color of law" element is unnecessary as opposed to federal law; no need to involve government actors i.e. police.

The Bane Act. Civil Code section 52.1.

“The Bane Act permits an individual to pursue a civil action for damages where another person ‘interferes by threat, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threat, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state.’ ‘The essence of a Bane Act claim is that the defendant, by the specified improper means (i.e., “threat[], intimidation or coercion”), tried to or did prevent the plaintiff from doing something he or she had the right to do under the law or to force the plaintiff to do something that he or she was not required to do under the law.’ ” (King v. State of California (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 265, 294 [195 Cal.Rptr.3d 286], internal citation omitted.)

The Bane Act provides that speech alone is not sufficient to constitute a violation unless it involves a credible threat of violence. (Civ. Code, § 52.1(j).) This limitation would appear to foreclose a claim based on threats, intimidation, or coercion involving a nonviolent consequence. (See Cabesuela v. Browning-Ferris Industries (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 101, 111 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 60] [to state a cause of action under Bane Act there must first be violence or intimidation by threat of violence].) For example, it would not be a violation to threaten to report someone to immigration if the person exercises a right granted under labor law. 

No case has been found, however, that applies the speech limitation to foreclose such a claim, and several courts have suggested that this point is not fully settled. (See Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 947, 959 [137 Cal.Rptr.3d 839] 256. [we “need not decide that every plaintiff must allege violence or threats of violence in order to maintain an action under section 52.1”]; City and County of San Francisco v. Ballard (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 381, 408 [39 Cal.Rptr.3d 1] [also noting issue but finding it unnecessary to address].) 

 The Unruh Act states, “All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sexual orientation, citizenship, primary language, or immigration status are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.” (§ 51, subd. (b).) In California, “[t]wo overlapping laws, the Unruh Civil Rights Act (§ 51) and the Disabled Persons Act (§§ 54-55.3), are the principal sources of state disability access protection.” (Jankey v. Lee (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1038, 1044.)   “The Unruh Civil Rights Act broadly outlaws arbitrary discrimination in public accommodations and includes disability as one among many prohibited bases. (§ 51, subd. (b).)

Civil Code section 52 (a) provides for damages up to three times actual damages but a minimum of $4,000 for violations of Civil Code section 51 (Unruh Act),51.5, and 51.6. Civil Code section 52(b) provides for punitive damages for violations of Civil Code sections 51.7 (Ralph Act) and 51.9. Neither subsection of Section 52 mentions the Bane Act or Civil Code section 52.1. Nevertheless, the reference to section 52 in subsection (b) of the Bane Act would seem to indicate that damages may be recovered under both subsections (a) and (b) of section 52.

Under the Unruh Act, if only the statutory minimum damages of $4,000 is sought, it is not necessary to prove harm and causation. (See Koire v. Metro Car Wash (1985) 40 Cal.3d 24, 33 [219 Cal.Rptr. 133, 707 P.2d 195] [Section 52 provides for minimum statutory damages for every violation of section 51, regardless of the plaintiff’s actual damages]; see also Civ. Code, § 52(h) [“actual damages” means special and general damages].) Presumably, the same rule applies under the Bane Act as the statutory minimum of section 52(a) should be recoverable.

“The Legislature enacted section 52.1 to stem a tide of hate crimes.” (Jones v.Kmart Corp. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 329, 338 [70 Cal.Rptr.2d 844, 949 P.2d 941], internal citation omitted.)

With respect to who a Bane Act claim may be brought against, Section 52.1 allows claims to be brought against “a person or persons, whether or not acting under color of state law ….” (Civ. Code § 51, subd. (a).) The scope of this is as broad as it seems. The word “person” includes the panoply of non-biological legal persons, including corporations and public agencies. (See Civ. Code, § 14 [defining “person” to include a corporation]; see, e.g., Jones v. Kmart Corp.(1998) 17 Cal.4th 329 [reversing liability against a corporation under the Bane Act on unrelated substantive grounds, but never disputing the liability of a corporation under the Bane Act]; Gatto v. County of Sonoma (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 744 [affirming Bane Act liability against a county].) Further, “[g]overnment entities have respondeat superior liability for their employees’ Bane Act violations.” (Gant v. County of Los Angeles (C.D. Cal. 2011) 765 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1249-50.) 

Under federal law, a plaintiff may bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress violations of his "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and [federal] laws" by a person or entity, including a municipality, acting under the color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-95, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).  Malicious prosecution actions are not limited to suits against prosecutors but may be brought against other persons who have wrongfully caused charges to be filed. Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1126-27 (9th Cir.2002).  See Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004) on non-governmental defendant's liablity for violations of federal statute.  That liability could be brought for violations of the 1st, 4th, and 14th Amendment (Due Process and Equal Protection) violations. Additionallly, although governmental actors may be entitiled to qualified immunity; private actors are not.  

Banning a minority citizen of the United States from a business establishment, harassing and intimidating him by colludling with police and making false crimnal reports in retaliation for complaining and execrcising his 1st Amendment Rights under the U.S. Constitution; is both actionable under State of California Statute and Federal law.  

Nobody should be subjected to such conduct and shoud be made an example of in the Courts of our land!

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#2 Author of original report

Pathetic? Idiotic? Read My Reviews on Peet's Coffee & Tea and It is Easy to Determine Who All the Pathetic Idiots Are Who Didn't Get Their Way!

AUTHOR: Robert - (United States)

POSTED: Friday, April 26, 2019

I rest my case!

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#1 Consumer Comment

Ridiculous

AUTHOR: Stacey - (United States)

POSTED: Thursday, April 25, 2019

What a pathetic attempt to slam a company - what do they have? Segregated booths?? Do they make the blacks sit in the back? Idiotic. Are you a member of the Bar in your area? Are you a practicing Attorney? Your report is nothing more than an attempt to get your way when you did not. 

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